Assinale o item abaixo sobre o modelo IS-LM se é certo ou errado:

Item 0 - Quanto mais sensível for a demanda agregada à taxa de juros, maior o efeito da política monetária sobre o produto.

Nos anos que antecederam a implementação do Plano Real (1992 a 1993) houve um expressivo crescimento do passivo externo bruto da economia brasileira. Tal processo:

Item 3 - foi acompanhado de um acentuado crescimento tanto das reservas internacionais do país como da dívida mobiliária federal;

As reformas institucionais de meados dos anos sessenta, mormente dos sistemas monetário-financeiro e fiscal, foram importantes à retomada do crescimento econômico a partir de 1968. Diante desse fato pode-se afirmar que:

Item 0 - o mercado de capitais, estimulado pelos fundos fiscais, passou a mobilizar recursos para a capitalização das pequenas e médias empresas produtivas do país;

“Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, by Henry J. Breton, Journal of Economic Literature June 1998, pp. 903-936.

The following text contains two sections of the article above by Henry J. Breton. Your job is to agree or disagree with these statements. Read the definition and mark it right or wrong.

Section 3.1. Reflection of the Market Solution

The view that a more or less free market would not solve the development problem was widely accepted. The problem was not market failure in the usual textbook sense (externalities, decreasing costs, etc.). Rather, the notion was that the division of labor between the rich countries and the poor ones seemed to doom the latter to permanent poverty. The most widely cited evidence was data purporting to show that the net barter terms of trade had turned against the developing countries over the decades prior to 1940. Raul Prebisch, Hares Singer, and others calculated many such series that seemed to show a secular deterioration in the terms of trade of the poor countries. Prebisch's explanation that the gains from productivity growth in the North resulted in rising wages, not falling prices, due to the monopoly power of both labor and firms in the North, was widely accepted. In the South, dependent mainly on agricultural and mineral exports, there was lower productivity growth, and surplus labor, weak unions, and competition among exporters held down wages. The rewards of productivity growth in manufacturing activities were thus not available to importers of such products in the South.

Also cited as a source of difficulties were Engel curve arguments that the income elasticity of demand for agricultural products and raw materials in the North declines as incomes reach higher and higher levels. If exports lagged behind the growth of income in the South for this reason, then import substitution of some kind must take place to protect the balance of payments, or growth would slow or stop. Widespread protection of agriculture in many rich countries exacerbated this effect. Added to all this was the argument that cyclical

changes in the North resulted in reduced employment and income, and hence import, rather than in falling product and factor prices. while in the South it was wages and prices that responded to downturns.

The specific arguments about the terms of trade were buttressed by more general views that the market was an instrument that kept poor countries poor and rich countries rich. There were several reasons for such views. Men who led independence movements had lived their adult lives during two world wars and a devastating worldwide depression that severely penalized the South. Predictions in mid to the late forties were generally to the effect that the post-World War II world economy would resemble that of the 1930's. Though the years 1870 to 1914 were fairly satisfactory, that period was hardly fresh in any decision maker's mind, and at that date, Europe and the United States had been growing steadily for 50 to 75 years, while most of the rest of the world's population remained mired in severe and mass poverty. In addition, the Keynesian ideas that even a perfectly functioning market may not ensure full utilization of resources were becoming widely accepted. The conclusion for many policy makers and professional economists was clear: the "structure" of the economies of the developing countries had to be changed in fundamental ways if they were to compete on equal terms in the world markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this sort of structural change.

The Soviet Union's experience had yet to be understood very well, and many otherwise informed economists and political leaders were impressed by w-hat evidence was available. The great evils of the Stalin era were not widely known. It was known, however, that growth during the 1920's and 1930's had been quite remarkable. The USSR's commitment to central planning and to large-scale, capital intensive industrialization was especially appealing to those countries that put great weight on becoming a world economic power.

India was such a country, and the Indian effort was widely regarded as a model by other developing countries in the 1950's. The defense of the investment in heavy industry rested on strong assumptions that there were economy-wide effects on productivity growth created by a domestic capital goods sector; furthermore, economic independence required a country to have its own large-scale capital goods sector.

This view of development was most clearly articulated by P.C. Mahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute, who argued that the countries must not only change their structure, but must change it by creating a domestic heavy capital goods sector. The Indian Second Plan (1956-61) was greatly influenced by the Mahalanobis view. Wilfred Malenbaum (1962, p. 87) shows that the investment allocation for the second plan was virtually equivalent to that worked out by Mahalanobis in his operational research exercises (Mahalanobis 1955). In both, about one-third of total investment was allocated to "basic investment goods," about 18 percent to industrial consumer goods, and 17 percent to agriculture. Equally important, there was essentially no effort to allocate resources optimally in the usual sense. Other people showed that the objectives could have been achieved with less capital than the plan called for, and that more jobs could have been created. Such findings were not looked upon as especially relevant (or accurate), given the assumed (but not measured) externalities and the importance of the economic independence objective.

Mahalanobis' argument fit well with the structuralism of Prebisch and his Latin American colleagues. There it was widely assumed that factor prices, especially wage rates and the exchange rate, had little effect on the quantity of such factors demanded or on the choice of production techniques; output and its composition were the determining factors. In Latin America more than elsewhere, the strong structuralist view prevailed that wage rates could be high in order to attack the poverty problem with no cost in terms of employment. Similarly, the exchange rate did not matter much for exporting, so its value could be set to achieve other objectives, such as inducing capital formation or dampening inflation.

Given these arguments, many students and policy makers in much of the world believed that the appropriate strategy for development was to replace imports from the rich North with their own domestic production. Large-scale comprehensive planning, rather than the market, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument, even though the understanding of how to design and implement a plan was as primitive as was the understanding of growth.

Developing countries, especially India, were impressed by the performance of the Soviet Union with its emphasis on heavy capital industries. This lead to:

Item 1 - The attention to investment industry, especially in the Indian plans, gave less emphasis to job creation than to capital formation.

“Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, by Henry J. Breton, Journal of Economic Literature June 1998, pp. 903-936.

The following text contains two sections of the article above by Henry J. Breton. Your job is to agree or disagree with these statements. Read the definition and mark it right or wrong.

Section 3.1. Reflection of the Market Solution

The view that a more or less free market would not solve the development problem was widely accepted. The problem was not market failure in the usual textbook sense (externalities, decreasing costs, etc.). Rather, the notion was that the division of labor between the rich countries and the poor ones seemed to doom the latter to permanent poverty. The most widely cited evidence was data purporting to show that the net barter terms of trade had turned against the developing countries over the decades prior to 1940. Raul Prebisch, Hares Singer, and others calculated many such series that seemed to show a secular deterioration in the terms of trade of the poor countries. Prebisch's explanation that the gains from productivity growth in the North resulted in rising wages, not falling prices, due to the monopoly power of both labor and firms in the North, was widely accepted. In the South, dependent mainly on agricultural and mineral exports, there was lower productivity growth, and surplus labor, weak unions, and competition among exporters held down wages. The rewards of productivity growth in manufacturing activities were thus not available to importers of such products in the South.

Also cited as a source of difficulties were Engel curve arguments that the income elasticity of demand for agricultural products and raw materials in the North declines as incomes reach higher and higher levels. If exports lagged behind the growth of income in the South for this reason, then import substitution of some kind must take place to protect the balance of payments, or growth would slow or stop. Widespread protection of agriculture in many rich countries exacerbated this effect. Added to all this was the argument that cyclical

changes in the North resulted in reduced employment and income, and hence import, rather than in falling product and factor prices. while in the South it was wages and prices that responded to downturns.

The specific arguments about the terms of trade were buttressed by more general views that the market was an instrument that kept poor countries poor and rich countries rich. There were several reasons for such views. Men who led independence movements had lived their adult lives during two world wars and a devastating worldwide depression that severely penalized the South. Predictions in mid to the late forties were generally to the effect that the post-World War II world economy would resemble that of the 1930's. Though the years 1870 to 1914 were fairly satisfactory, that period was hardly fresh in any decision maker's mind, and at that date, Europe and the United States had been growing steadily for 50 to 75 years, while most of the rest of the world's population remained mired in severe and mass poverty. In addition, the Keynesian ideas that even a perfectly functioning market may not ensure full utilization of resources were becoming widely accepted. The conclusion for many policy makers and professional economists was clear: the "structure" of the economies of the developing countries had to be changed in fundamental ways if they were to compete on equal terms in the world markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this sort of structural change.

The Soviet Union's experience had yet to be understood very well, and many otherwise informed economists and political leaders were impressed by w-hat evidence was available. The great evils of the Stalin era were not widely known. It was known, however, that growth during the 1920's and 1930's had been quite remarkable. The USSR's commitment to central planning and to large-scale, capital intensive industrialization was especially appealing to those countries that put great weight on becoming a world economic power.

India was such a country, and the Indian effort was widely regarded as a model by other developing countries in the 1950's. The defense of the investment in heavy industry rested on strong assumptions that there were economy-wide effects on productivity growth created by a domestic capital goods sector; furthermore, economic independence required a country to have its own large-scale capital goods sector.

This view of development was most clearly articulated by P.C. Mahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute, who argued that the countries must not only change their structure, but must change it by creating a domestic heavy capital goods sector. The Indian Second Plan (1956-61) was greatly influenced by the Mahalanobis view. Wilfred Malenbaum (1962, p. 87) shows that the investment allocation for the second plan was virtually equivalent to that worked out by Mahalanobis in his operational research exercises (Mahalanobis 1955). In both, about one-third of total investment was allocated to "basic investment goods," about 18 percent to industrial consumer goods, and 17 percent to agriculture. Equally important, there was essentially no effort to allocate resources optimally in the usual sense. Other people showed that the objectives could have been achieved with less capital than the plan called for, and that more jobs could have been created. Such findings were not looked upon as especially relevant (or accurate), given the assumed (but not measured) externalities and the importance of the economic independence objective.

Mahalanobis' argument fit well with the structuralism of Prebisch and his Latin American colleagues. There it was widely assumed that factor prices, especially wage rates and the exchange rate, had little effect on the quantity of such factors demanded or on the choice of production techniques; output and its composition were the determining factors. In Latin America more than elsewhere, the strong structuralist view prevailed that wage rates could be high in order to attack the poverty problem with no cost in terms of employment. Similarly, the exchange rate did not matter much for exporting, so its value could be set to achieve other objectives, such as inducing capital formation or dampening inflation.

Given these arguments, many students and policy makers in much of the world believed that the appropriate strategy for development was to replace imports from the rich North with their own domestic production. Large-scale comprehensive planning, rather than the market, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument, even though the understanding of how to design and implement a plan was as primitive as was the understanding of growth.

The proponents of import substitution policies argued for some measures to protect the balance of payments because:

Item 3 - The agriculture sector in developing countries had to be protected because their level of capital investment was very low.

Considere o seguinte modelo de duopólio de Cournot. Existem duas firmas produzindo um produto homogêneo, com funções de custo respectivamente c1(q1) = 5 q1² e c2 (q2) = 2 q2². A curva de demanda é dada por P = 200 - 4 Q, onde Q = q1 + q2. Assim:

Item 1 - No equilíbrio de Nash, a firma 2 produz 14 unidades.

Considere uma firma que dispõe de tecnologia representada pela função de produção f(K,L) = min {3K, 2L}. A firma tem como objetivo maximizar a quantidade produzida, sujeito a restrição de custo. Nesta situação:

Item 2 - A firma utiliza os insumos tal que K = (²/₃) L, independentemente dos preços dos insumos.

“Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, by Henry J. Breton, Journal of Economic Literature June 1998, pp. 903-936.

The following text contains two sections of the article above by Henry J. Breton. Your job is to agree or disagree with these statements. Read the definition and mark it right or wrong.

Section 3.1. Reflection of the Market Solution

The view that a more or less free market would not solve the development problem was widely accepted. The problem was not market failure in the usual textbook sense (externalities, decreasing costs, etc.). Rather, the notion was that the division of labor between the rich countries and the poor ones seemed to doom the latter to permanent poverty. The most widely cited evidence was data purporting to show that the net barter terms of trade had turned against the developing countries over the decades prior to 1940. Raul Prebisch, Hares Singer, and others calculated many such series that seemed to show a secular deterioration in the terms of trade of the poor countries. Prebisch's explanation that the gains from productivity growth in the North resulted in rising wages, not falling prices, due to the monopoly power of both labor and firms in the North, was widely accepted. In the South, dependent mainly on agricultural and mineral exports, there was lower productivity growth, and surplus labor, weak unions, and competition among exporters held down wages. The rewards of productivity growth in manufacturing activities were thus not available to importers of such products in the South.

Also cited as a source of difficulties were Engel curve arguments that the income elasticity of demand for agricultural products and raw materials in the North declines as incomes reach higher and higher levels. If exports lagged behind the growth of income in the South for this reason, then import substitution of some kind must take place to protect the balance of payments, or growth would slow or stop. Widespread protection of agriculture in many rich countries exacerbated this effect. Added to all this was the argument that cyclical

changes in the North resulted in reduced employment and income, and hence import, rather than in falling product and factor prices. while in the South it was wages and prices that responded to downturns.

The specific arguments about the terms of trade were buttressed by more general views that the market was an instrument that kept poor countries poor and rich countries rich. There were several reasons for such views. Men who led independence movements had lived their adult lives during two world wars and a devastating worldwide depression that severely penalized the South. Predictions in mid to the late forties were generally to the effect that the post-World War II world economy would resemble that of the 1930's. Though the years 1870 to 1914 were fairly satisfactory, that period was hardly fresh in any decision maker's mind, and at that date, Europe and the United States had been growing steadily for 50 to 75 years, while most of the rest of the world's population remained mired in severe and mass poverty. In addition, the Keynesian ideas that even a perfectly functioning market may not ensure full utilization of resources were becoming widely accepted. The conclusion for many policy makers and professional economists was clear: the "structure" of the economies of the developing countries had to be changed in fundamental ways if they were to compete on equal terms in the world markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this sort of structural change.

The Soviet Union's experience had yet to be understood very well, and many otherwise informed economists and political leaders were impressed by w-hat evidence was available. The great evils of the Stalin era were not widely known. It was known, however, that growth during the 1920's and 1930's had been quite remarkable. The USSR's commitment to central planning and to large-scale, capital intensive industrialization was especially appealing to those countries that put great weight on becoming a world economic power.

India was such a country, and the Indian effort was widely regarded as a model by other developing countries in the 1950's. The defense of the investment in heavy industry rested on strong assumptions that there were economy-wide effects on productivity growth created by a domestic capital goods sector; furthermore, economic independence required a country to have its own large-scale capital goods sector.

This view of development was most clearly articulated by P.C. Mahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute, who argued that the countries must not only change their structure, but must change it by creating a domestic heavy capital goods sector. The Indian Second Plan (1956-61) was greatly influenced by the Mahalanobis view. Wilfred Malenbaum (1962, p. 87) shows that the investment allocation for the second plan was virtually equivalent to that worked out by Mahalanobis in his operational research exercises (Mahalanobis 1955). In both, about one-third of total investment was allocated to "basic investment goods," about 18 percent to industrial consumer goods, and 17 percent to agriculture. Equally important, there was essentially no effort to allocate resources optimally in the usual sense. Other people showed that the objectives could have been achieved with less capital than the plan called for, and that more jobs could have been created. Such findings were not looked upon as especially relevant (or accurate), given the assumed (but not measured) externalities and the importance of the economic independence objective.

Mahalanobis' argument fit well with the structuralism of Prebisch and his Latin American colleagues. There it was widely assumed that factor prices, especially wage rates and the exchange rate, had little effect on the quantity of such factors demanded or on the choice of production techniques; output and its composition were the determining factors. In Latin America more than elsewhere, the strong structuralist view prevailed that wage rates could be high in order to attack the poverty problem with no cost in terms of employment. Similarly, the exchange rate did not matter much for exporting, so its value could be set to achieve other objectives, such as inducing capital formation or dampening inflation.

Given these arguments, many students and policy makers in much of the world believed that the appropriate strategy for development was to replace imports from the rich North with their own domestic production. Large-scale comprehensive planning, rather than the market, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument, even though the understanding of how to design and implement a plan was as primitive as was the understanding of growth.

The text points out that the structuralist position was stronger in Latin America than in other parts of the world.

Item 1 - The economists of the region argued that factor prices had little effect on the quantity of factors demanded.

“Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, by Henry J. Breton, Journal of Economic Literature June 1998, pp. 903-936.

The following text contains two sections of the article above by Henry J. Breton. Your job is to agree or disagree with these statements. Read the definition and mark it right or wrong.

Section 3.1. Reflection of the Market Solution

The view that a more or less free market would not solve the development problem was widely accepted. The problem was not market failure in the usual textbook sense (externalities, decreasing costs, etc.). Rather, the notion was that the division of labor between the rich countries and the poor ones seemed to doom the latter to permanent poverty. The most widely cited evidence was data purporting to show that the net barter terms of trade had turned against the developing countries over the decades prior to 1940. Raul Prebisch, Hares Singer, and others calculated many such series that seemed to show a secular deterioration in the terms of trade of the poor countries. Prebisch's explanation that the gains from productivity growth in the North resulted in rising wages, not falling prices, due to the monopoly power of both labor and firms in the North, was widely accepted. In the South, dependent mainly on agricultural and mineral exports, there was lower productivity growth, and surplus labor, weak unions, and competition among exporters held down wages. The rewards of productivity growth in manufacturing activities were thus not available to importers of such products in the South.

Also cited as a source of difficulties were Engel curve arguments that the income elasticity of demand for agricultural products and raw materials in the North declines as incomes reach higher and higher levels. If exports lagged behind the growth of income in the South for this reason, then import substitution of some kind must take place to protect the balance of payments, or growth would slow or stop. Widespread protection of agriculture in many rich countries exacerbated this effect. Added to all this was the argument that cyclical

changes in the North resulted in reduced employment and income, and hence import, rather than in falling product and factor prices. while in the South it was wages and prices that responded to downturns.

The specific arguments about the terms of trade were buttressed by more general views that the market was an instrument that kept poor countries poor and rich countries rich. There were several reasons for such views. Men who led independence movements had lived their adult lives during two world wars and a devastating worldwide depression that severely penalized the South. Predictions in mid to the late forties were generally to the effect that the post-World War II world economy would resemble that of the 1930's. Though the years 1870 to 1914 were fairly satisfactory, that period was hardly fresh in any decision maker's mind, and at that date, Europe and the United States had been growing steadily for 50 to 75 years, while most of the rest of the world's population remained mired in severe and mass poverty. In addition, the Keynesian ideas that even a perfectly functioning market may not ensure full utilization of resources were becoming widely accepted. The conclusion for many policy makers and professional economists was clear: the "structure" of the economies of the developing countries had to be changed in fundamental ways if they were to compete on equal terms in the world markets, and a market mechanism could not bring about this sort of structural change.

The Soviet Union's experience had yet to be understood very well, and many otherwise informed economists and political leaders were impressed by w-hat evidence was available. The great evils of the Stalin era were not widely known. It was known, however, that growth during the 1920's and 1930's had been quite remarkable. The USSR's commitment to central planning and to large-scale, capital intensive industrialization was especially appealing to those countries that put great weight on becoming a world economic power.

India was such a country, and the Indian effort was widely regarded as a model by other developing countries in the 1950's. The defense of the investment in heavy industry rested on strong assumptions that there were economy-wide effects on productivity growth created by a domestic capital goods sector; furthermore, economic independence required a country to have its own large-scale capital goods sector.

This view of development was most clearly articulated by P.C. Mahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute, who argued that the countries must not only change their structure, but must change it by creating a domestic heavy capital goods sector. The Indian Second Plan (1956-61) was greatly influenced by the Mahalanobis view. Wilfred Malenbaum (1962, p. 87) shows that the investment allocation for the second plan was virtually equivalent to that worked out by Mahalanobis in his operational research exercises (Mahalanobis 1955). In both, about one-third of total investment was allocated to "basic investment goods," about 18 percent to industrial consumer goods, and 17 percent to agriculture. Equally important, there was essentially no effort to allocate resources optimally in the usual sense. Other people showed that the objectives could have been achieved with less capital than the plan called for, and that more jobs could have been created. Such findings were not looked upon as especially relevant (or accurate), given the assumed (but not measured) externalities and the importance of the economic independence objective.

Mahalanobis' argument fit well with the structuralism of Prebisch and his Latin American colleagues. There it was widely assumed that factor prices, especially wage rates and the exchange rate, had little effect on the quantity of such factors demanded or on the choice of production techniques; output and its composition were the determining factors. In Latin America more than elsewhere, the strong structuralist view prevailed that wage rates could be high in order to attack the poverty problem with no cost in terms of employment. Similarly, the exchange rate did not matter much for exporting, so its value could be set to achieve other objectives, such as inducing capital formation or dampening inflation.

Given these arguments, many students and policy makers in much of the world believed that the appropriate strategy for development was to replace imports from the rich North with their own domestic production. Large-scale comprehensive planning, rather than the market, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument, even though the understanding of how to design and implement a plan was as primitive as was the understanding of growth.

According to the author, the arguments of the structuralist led to the conclusion that:

Item 1 - Planning rather than trust in the market was a better solution.

Considere uma loteria com 3 possíveis resultados: o recebimento de $100 com probabilidade 0,10; o recebimento de $25 com probabilidade 0,60; e o recebimento de $0 com probabilidade 0,30.

Item 3 - Quanto mais côncava a função-utilidade, maior é a aversão a risco do indivíduo.