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Em um mercado competitivo existem 1.000 consumidores idênticos com relação à demanda. Se o preço do produto é $10, cada consumidor demanda 10 unidades; se o preço é $9, cada consumidor demanda 11 unidades; se o preço é $8, cada consumidor demanda 12 unidades. O efeito-renda é nulo. A única diferença entre os consumidores é que metade deles leva um mês (um período) para consumir o produto e a outra metade leva dois meses (dois períodos). Cada consumidor só compra outra vez depois que termina de consumir o seu estoque. Em particular, no período t=0 (1º de janeiro) todos vão ao mercado e demandam, em t=1 (1º de fevereiro) apenas metade vai ao mercado e em t=2 (1º de março) todos vão ao mercado outra vez. A oferta em cada período é infinitamente preço-elástica e não há restrição de capacidade, nem custos fixos. Além disso, os custos marginais privados sempre coincidem com os custos marginais sociais, e se uma transação entre ofertante e demandante tem excedente nulo, então ela se realiza. Julgue o item a seguir:
Item 2 - Em t=1, o valor que a sociedade atribui aos recursos deslocados da economia para a produção desse bem cai de $10 para $9. Então a quantidade de equilíbrio em t=1 é de Q = 11.000 unidades.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Russia and NATO
Outgunned
The Atlantic alliance faces superior conventional forces near Russia’s borders
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
BOASTING about nuclear weapons is something Vladimir Putin clearly enjoys. In his annual stateof- the-nation speech on March 1st, he listed five new weapons. Russia’s president gave pride of place to the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile with, in effect, unlimited range, which was guaranteed to thwart America’s missile defences (see Science). He got the headlines he wanted, though there is nothing new about Russia being able to devastate America with nuclear weapons, nor anything likely to change on that front. What should concern Europe more than Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling are the formidable conventional forces that Russia is steadily building up, particularly in the Baltic region.
On most measures, NATO appears comfortably ahead of Russia. Between them, America and its European NATO allies spent $871bn on defence in 2015, compared with Russia’s $52bn. But as a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues, the reality on the ground is rather different. It finds that Russia would now enjoy significant local superiority in any confrontation with NATO close to its own border. NATO’s latent strengths, once they were brought to bear, would be too much for Russia to cope with. But in the early stages of a conflict, for at least the first month and possibly for a good deal longer, the alliance would find itself outnumbered, outranged and outgunned.
Since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has bolstered its forces in the Baltic region with what it calls its “enhanced forward presence”. By last summer, the alliance had a total of 4,530 troops near the border with Russia in four battle-groups led by Germany (in Lithuania), Britain (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia) and the United States (in Poland). But, in accord with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an anachronistic agreement that reflected a more optimistic time, the soldiers are not permanently based, but constantly rotate.
NATO has also beefed up its “very high readiness joint task-force” of about 5,000 more troops who can be deployed within a week. But it admits that neither force is more than a tripwire to convince Russia that any attack on them would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole.
Over the past decade, Western forces and their Russian counterparts have diverged in terms of capability. NATO members adjusted for counter-insurgency operations in places such as Afghanistan by restructuring with light expeditionary forces. Russia concentrated on rebuilding forces with the mobility and firepower to wage high-intensity warfare against a peer adversary. As part of a comprehensive effort at military reform following a disjointed performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia has professionalised its forces (largely relegating conscripts to a second echelon), equipped them with modern heavy weapons, and honed them with frequent large-scale exercises and combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
What worries NATO commanders, such as General Sir Nicholas Carter, chief of Britain’s general staff, and his American opposite number, General Mark Milley, is the sheer amount of combat power Russia can concentrate at very short notice in the Baltic region. RAND found that in main battle tanks, Russia would outnumber NATO by 5.9 to 1; in infantry fighting vehicles by 4.6 to 1; in rocket artillery by 270 to none. And while NATO would enjoy a substantial advantage in combat aircraft, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced when faced with the world’s most powerful integrated theatre air defences.
Russia’s edge over NATO, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is increased by its ability to use its internal lines to reinforce at speed. By contrast, NATO has neglected to preserve its cold-war military-transport infrastructure. Bridges cannot take the weight of tanks, and rail systems are not designed for trucks carrying heavy armour.
There is plenty that NATO could do to enhance conventional deterrence. It could permanently station forces in the Baltic region with more hitting power; it could hold regular large-scale short-notice exercises; it could invest in strengthening its internal lines; individual member countries could do more to meet their spending obligations and use the money to restructure their ground forces for high-intensity conflict.
Whether NATO is capable of such focus is debatable. Its southern members worry more about refugee flows; France is fighting an insurgency in the Sahel; Germany’s new coalition agreement relegated the (wretched) state of its armed forces to page 156 of a 177-page document. Mr Putin’s priorities are very different.
We infer from the text that
Item 0 - NATO and Russian forces have the same focus in terms of capability;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Russia and NATO
Outgunned
The Atlantic alliance faces superior conventional forces near Russia’s borders
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
BOASTING about nuclear weapons is something Vladimir Putin clearly enjoys. In his annual stateof- the-nation speech on March 1st, he listed five new weapons. Russia’s president gave pride of place to the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile with, in effect, unlimited range, which was guaranteed to thwart America’s missile defences (see Science). He got the headlines he wanted, though there is nothing new about Russia being able to devastate America with nuclear weapons, nor anything likely to change on that front. What should concern Europe more than Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling are the formidable conventional forces that Russia is steadily building up, particularly in the Baltic region.
On most measures, NATO appears comfortably ahead of Russia. Between them, America and its European NATO allies spent $871bn on defence in 2015, compared with Russia’s $52bn. But as a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues, the reality on the ground is rather different. It finds that Russia would now enjoy significant local superiority in any confrontation with NATO close to its own border. NATO’s latent strengths, once they were brought to bear, would be too much for Russia to cope with. But in the early stages of a conflict, for at least the first month and possibly for a good deal longer, the alliance would find itself outnumbered, outranged and outgunned.
Since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has bolstered its forces in the Baltic region with what it calls its “enhanced forward presence”. By last summer, the alliance had a total of 4,530 troops near the border with Russia in four battle-groups led by Germany (in Lithuania), Britain (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia) and the United States (in Poland). But, in accord with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an anachronistic agreement that reflected a more optimistic time, the soldiers are not permanently based, but constantly rotate.
NATO has also beefed up its “very high readiness joint task-force” of about 5,000 more troops who can be deployed within a week. But it admits that neither force is more than a tripwire to convince Russia that any attack on them would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole.
Over the past decade, Western forces and their Russian counterparts have diverged in terms of capability. NATO members adjusted for counter-insurgency operations in places such as Afghanistan by restructuring with light expeditionary forces. Russia concentrated on rebuilding forces with the mobility and firepower to wage high-intensity warfare against a peer adversary. As part of a comprehensive effort at military reform following a disjointed performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia has professionalised its forces (largely relegating conscripts to a second echelon), equipped them with modern heavy weapons, and honed them with frequent large-scale exercises and combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
What worries NATO commanders, such as General Sir Nicholas Carter, chief of Britain’s general staff, and his American opposite number, General Mark Milley, is the sheer amount of combat power Russia can concentrate at very short notice in the Baltic region. RAND found that in main battle tanks, Russia would outnumber NATO by 5.9 to 1; in infantry fighting vehicles by 4.6 to 1; in rocket artillery by 270 to none. And while NATO would enjoy a substantial advantage in combat aircraft, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced when faced with the world’s most powerful integrated theatre air defences.
Russia’s edge over NATO, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is increased by its ability to use its internal lines to reinforce at speed. By contrast, NATO has neglected to preserve its cold-war military-transport infrastructure. Bridges cannot take the weight of tanks, and rail systems are not designed for trucks carrying heavy armour.
There is plenty that NATO could do to enhance conventional deterrence. It could permanently station forces in the Baltic region with more hitting power; it could hold regular large-scale short-notice exercises; it could invest in strengthening its internal lines; individual member countries could do more to meet their spending obligations and use the money to restructure their ground forces for high-intensity conflict.
Whether NATO is capable of such focus is debatable. Its southern members worry more about refugee flows; France is fighting an insurgency in the Sahel; Germany’s new coalition agreement relegated the (wretched) state of its armed forces to page 156 of a 177-page document. Mr Putin’s priorities are very different.
From the text, NATO
Item 4 - has adequate internal lines.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Avalie o item abaixo como certo ou errado baseando-se no Modelo de Preços Rígidos e/ou na Curva de Oferta de Lucas (Modelo de Informação Imperfeita), com curvas traçadas no plano produto versus nível geral de preços:
Item 3 - A curva de oferta agregada de curto prazo gerada a partir do Modelo de Preços Rígidos é tanto mais inclinada (ou íngreme) quanto maior for a taxa média de inflação.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Considere a oferta de uma indústria perfeitamente competitiva. Julgue o item a seguir como certo ou errado:
Item 2 - No equilíbrio de longo prazo, a indústria terá o número máximo de empresas compatível com lucros não negativos.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Avalie como certo ou errado a seguinte afirmativa:
Item 4 - Segundo a Teoria do Ciclo de Vida, uma elevação da renda permanente das famílias levará a um aumento da propensão média das famílias a poupar.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Sobre a economia brasileira na década de 1980, pode-se afirmar:
Item 3 - Pelo menos em parte, o crescimento real das exportações em alguns anos do início da década pode ser atribuído ao II PND.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Sobre os debates a respeito da evolução da indústria brasileira a partir dos anos 1990, podemos dizer:
Item 2 - Apesar do caráter liberalizante dos governos FHC, ocorreu em 1995 uma elevação da tarifa média de importação em razão da apreensão causada pela deterioração da conta externa pós-crise do México.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Suponha que temos dois conjuntos não vazios (A e B) de números reais. Sejam !$ f: A \rightarrow B !$ e !$ g: B \rightarrow A !$ duas funções que satisfazem !$ g (f(x)) = x !$ para todo !$ x ∈ A !$. Julgue a seguinte afirmativa:
Item 1 - A função !$ f !$ é sobrejetora.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Sobre a política econômica realizada na primeira década do século XXI, pode-se afirmar:
Item 4 - O Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC 1), de 2007, incorporou propostas para alavancar os investimentos, objetivando reverter uma conjuntura que sinalizava para o ingresso em uma fase de recessão.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Cadernos
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