Trecho 1: Caso Cooke versus Forbes. Um dos processos na tecelagem de tapetes de fibra de cacau [Cooke] era imergi-lo em um líquido alvejante e, depois, pendurá-lo para secagem. Vapores de um produtor de sulfato de amônia [Forbes] tinham o efeito de transformar a cor brilhosa do tapete em uma cor escurecida e fosca. (…) Uma ação foi ajuizada para impedir a manufatura de emitir tais vapores. Os advogados do réu argumentaram que, se o autor “não usasse um líquido alvejante específico, as fibras não seriam afetadas; que seu método de produção era atípico, contrário ao costume do comércio (…)”. O juiz explanou: “parece-me claro que uma pessoa tem o direito de, na sua propriedade, realizar um processo de manufatura em que se usa cloreto de estanho, ou qualquer outro tipo de corante metálico, e que seu vizinho não tem a liberdade para inundar o ambiente com gás que vai interferir na sua manufatura. Se isto pode ser imputado ao seu vizinho, então, compreendo eu, claramente ele terá o direito de vir aqui e pedir ajuda”.

Trecho 2: (…) Com efeito, as propostas de solução do problema da poluição causada pela fumaça, bem como de outros problemas similares, feitas por meio da tributação, se sustenta com dificuldades advindas dos problemas relativos ao cálculo, da diferença entre dano médio e dano marginal e das inter-relações entre os danos causados a diversas propriedades etc.

R. H. COASE. O problema do custo social. In: Journal of Law and Economics. 1960 (traduzido e adaptado).

Com referência ao que é apresentado nos trechos 1 e 2, julgue (C ou E) o item a seguir, acerca da análise de custo-benefício, com base na teoria dos tipos de mercados e de bens.

A solução para o problema apresentado no primeiro trecho, de acordo com o teorema de Coase, é a correta atribuição dos direitos de propriedade envolvidos no caso, desde que não haja custos de transação.

Trecho 1: Caso Cooke versus Forbes. Um dos processos na tecelagem de tapetes de fibra de cacau [Cooke] era imergi-lo em um líquido alvejante e, depois, pendurá-lo para secagem. Vapores de um produtor de sulfato de amônia [Forbes] tinham o efeito de transformar a cor brilhosa do tapete em uma cor escurecida e fosca. (…) Uma ação foi ajuizada para impedir a manufatura de emitir tais vapores. Os advogados do réu argumentaram que, se o autor “não usasse um líquido alvejante específico, as fibras não seriam afetadas; que seu método de produção era atípico, contrário ao costume do comércio (…)”. O juiz explanou: “parece-me claro que uma pessoa tem o direito de, na sua propriedade, realizar um processo de manufatura em que se usa cloreto de estanho, ou qualquer outro tipo de corante metálico, e que seu vizinho não tem a liberdade para inundar o ambiente com gás que vai interferir na sua manufatura. Se isto pode ser imputado ao seu vizinho, então, compreendo eu, claramente ele terá o direito de vir aqui e pedir ajuda”.

Trecho 2: (…) Com efeito, as propostas de solução do problema da poluição causada pela fumaça, bem como de outros problemas similares, feitas por meio da tributação, se sustenta com dificuldades advindas dos problemas relativos ao cálculo, da diferença entre dano médio e dano marginal e das inter-relações entre os danos causados a diversas propriedades etc.

R. H. COASE. O problema do custo social. In: Journal of Law and Economics. 1960 (traduzido e adaptado).

Com referência ao que é apresentado nos trechos 1 e 2, julgue (C ou E) o item a seguir, acerca da análise de custo-benefício, com base na teoria dos tipos de mercados e de bens.

O problema apresentado no primeiro trecho, que se refere ao julgamento do processo de Cooke contra Forbes, é conhecido como externalidade.

Text VI

President Trump’s remarks in recent weeks — contending that fellow NATO members “owe [the United States] a tremendous amount of money,” labeling the European Union a trade “foe” and calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a good competitor,” for example — have heightened the anxiety of observers who question the resilience of the postwar order. Some focus on the challenges posed by external actors — whether the selective revisionism of China as a complex competitor-cum-partner or the more confrontational behavior of Russia, which appears to have calculated that it can obtain more short-term influence by destabilizing the system than by integrating into it.

Others are more concerned with internal stresses. Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy — which has surfaced and amplified simmering economic and demographic anxieties among a significant segment of the American public — articulates a sharp critique of the order’s alleged strategic benefits to the United States, its leading architect. Across the pond, meanwhile, increasingly powerful populist forces from a broad ideological spectrum are contesting the legitimacy of the European project.

While these various accounts go a long way in explaining the postwar order’s woes, they discount an important explanation: having thus far succeeded in achieving its foundational goal — averting a third world war — the postwar order lacks imperatives of comparable urgency to impel its modernization.

It is misleading to characterize the postwar era as a “long peace.” Proxy wars, civil wars and genocides have killed tens of millions over the past three-quarters of a century. Nor do observers agree why a war between great powers has not occurred during that time: they have offered explanations as diverse as “war aversion”, nuclear weapons, the U.S. alliance system and Enlightenment values.

Still, the headline accomplishment remains: no global conflagration has occurred under the aegis of the postwar order. However, this is not to suggest that the system is performing well; to the contrary, its limitations are widely understood and increasingly apparent. It is insufficiently responsive to and reflective of the evolving balance of power, which continues to shift eastward.

The modernization of the world order would ideally result from farsighted diplomacy. It is more likely, though, that policymakers will do little more than push for incremental improvements to an inadequate system, thereby enabling the aforementioned forces —ranging from external challenges to populist uprisings — to continue testing its foundations. The potential result of indefinite erosion — a vacuum in order, without a coherent alternative to replace it — is unpalatable. In a nuclear age, though, it is terrifying to consider what might have to occur for a new order to emerge.

Ali Wyne. A new world order will likely arise only from calamity. The Washington Post, jul./2018 (adapted).

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text VI, decide whether the following item are right C or wrong E.

The word “simmering” could be replaced by vocal without altering the general meaning of the passage.

Text VI

President Trump’s remarks in recent weeks — contending that fellow NATO members “owe [the United States] a tremendous amount of money,” labeling the European Union a trade “foe” and calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a good competitor,” for example — have heightened the anxiety of observers who question the resilience of the postwar order. Some focus on the challenges posed by external actors — whether the selective revisionism of China as a complex competitor-cum-partner or the more confrontational behavior of Russia, which appears to have calculated that it can obtain more short-term influence by destabilizing the system than by integrating into it.

Others are more concerned with internal stresses. Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy — which has surfaced and amplified simmering economic and demographic anxieties among a significant segment of the American public — articulates a sharp critique of the order’s alleged strategic benefits to the United States, its leading architect. Across the pond, meanwhile, increasingly powerful populist forces from a broad ideological spectrum are contesting the legitimacy of the European project.

While these various accounts go a long way in explaining the postwar order’s woes, they discount an important explanation: having thus far succeeded in achieving its foundational goal — averting a third world war — the postwar order lacks imperatives of comparable urgency to impel its modernization.

It is misleading to characterize the postwar era as a “long peace.” Proxy wars, civil wars and genocides have killed tens of millions over the past three-quarters of a century. Nor do observers agree why a war between great powers has not occurred during that time: they have offered explanations as diverse as “war aversion”, nuclear weapons, the U.S. alliance system and Enlightenment values.

Still, the headline accomplishment remains: no global conflagration has occurred under the aegis of the postwar order. However, this is not to suggest that the system is performing well; to the contrary, its limitations are widely understood and increasingly apparent. It is insufficiently responsive to and reflective of the evolving balance of power, which continues to shift eastward.

The modernization of the world order would ideally result from farsighted diplomacy. It is more likely, though, that policymakers will do little more than push for incremental improvements to an inadequate system, thereby enabling the aforementioned forces —ranging from external challenges to populist uprisings — to continue testing its foundations. The potential result of indefinite erosion — a vacuum in order, without a coherent alternative to replace it — is unpalatable. In a nuclear age, though, it is terrifying to consider what might have to occur for a new order to emerge.

Ali Wyne. A new world order will likely arise only from calamity. The Washington Post, jul./2018 (adapted).

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text VI, decide whether the following item are right C or wrong E.

The idiom “Across the pond” could be replaced by Overseas, without altering the meaning of the sentence.

Text VI

President Trump’s remarks in recent weeks — contending that fellow NATO members “owe [the United States] a tremendous amount of money,” labeling the European Union a trade “foe” and calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a good competitor,” for example — have heightened the anxiety of observers who question the resilience of the postwar order. Some focus on the challenges posed by external actors — whether the selective revisionism of China as a complex competitor-cum-partner or the more confrontational behavior of Russia, which appears to have calculated that it can obtain more short-term influence by destabilizing the system than by integrating into it.

Others are more concerned with internal stresses. Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy — which has surfaced and amplified simmering economic and demographic anxieties among a significant segment of the American public — articulates a sharp critique of the order’s alleged strategic benefits to the United States, its leading architect. Across the pond, meanwhile, increasingly powerful populist forces from a broad ideological spectrum are contesting the legitimacy of the European project.

While these various accounts go a long way in explaining the postwar order’s woes, they discount an important explanation: having thus far succeeded in achieving its foundational goal — averting a third world war — the postwar order lacks imperatives of comparable urgency to impel its modernization.

It is misleading to characterize the postwar era as a “long peace.” Proxy wars, civil wars and genocides have killed tens of millions over the past three-quarters of a century. Nor do observers agree why a war between great powers has not occurred during that time: they have offered explanations as diverse as “war aversion”, nuclear weapons, the U.S. alliance system and Enlightenment values.

Still, the headline accomplishment remains: no global conflagration has occurred under the aegis of the postwar order. However, this is not to suggest that the system is performing well; to the contrary, its limitations are widely understood and increasingly apparent. It is insufficiently responsive to and reflective of the evolving balance of power, which continues to shift eastward.

The modernization of the world order would ideally result from farsighted diplomacy. It is more likely, though, that policymakers will do little more than push for incremental improvements to an inadequate system, thereby enabling the aforementioned forces —ranging from external challenges to populist uprisings — to continue testing its foundations. The potential result of indefinite erosion — a vacuum in order, without a coherent alternative to replace it — is unpalatable. In a nuclear age, though, it is terrifying to consider what might have to occur for a new order to emerge.

Ali Wyne. A new world order will likely arise only from calamity. The Washington Post, jul./2018 (adapted).

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text VI, decide whether the following item are right C or wrong E.

The word “aegis” could be replaced by auspices in this particular context.

Text VI

President Trump’s remarks in recent weeks — contending that fellow NATO members “owe [the United States] a tremendous amount of money,” labeling the European Union a trade “foe” and calling Russian President Vladimir Putin “a good competitor,” for example — have heightened the anxiety of observers who question the resilience of the postwar order. Some focus on the challenges posed by external actors — whether the selective revisionism of China as a complex competitor-cum-partner or the more confrontational behavior of Russia, which appears to have calculated that it can obtain more short-term influence by destabilizing the system than by integrating into it.

Others are more concerned with internal stresses. Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy — which has surfaced and amplified simmering economic and demographic anxieties among a significant segment of the American public — articulates a sharp critique of the order’s alleged strategic benefits to the United States, its leading architect. Across the pond, meanwhile, increasingly powerful populist forces from a broad ideological spectrum are contesting the legitimacy of the European project.

While these various accounts go a long way in explaining the postwar order’s woes, they discount an important explanation: having thus far succeeded in achieving its foundational goal — averting a third world war — the postwar order lacks imperatives of comparable urgency to impel its modernization.

It is misleading to characterize the postwar era as a “long peace.” Proxy wars, civil wars and genocides have killed tens of millions over the past three-quarters of a century. Nor do observers agree why a war between great powers has not occurred during that time: they have offered explanations as diverse as “war aversion”, nuclear weapons, the U.S. alliance system and Enlightenment values.

Still, the headline accomplishment remains: no global conflagration has occurred under the aegis of the postwar order. However, this is not to suggest that the system is performing well; to the contrary, its limitations are widely understood and increasingly apparent. It is insufficiently responsive to and reflective of the evolving balance of power, which continues to shift eastward.

The modernization of the world order would ideally result from farsighted diplomacy. It is more likely, though, that policymakers will do little more than push for incremental improvements to an inadequate system, thereby enabling the aforementioned forces —ranging from external challenges to populist uprisings — to continue testing its foundations. The potential result of indefinite erosion — a vacuum in order, without a coherent alternative to replace it — is unpalatable. In a nuclear age, though, it is terrifying to consider what might have to occur for a new order to emerge.

Ali Wyne. A new world order will likely arise only from calamity. The Washington Post, jul./2018 (adapted).

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text VI, decide whether the following item are right C or wrong E.

The phrase “obtain more” could be correctly replaced by accrue, without altering the meaning of the passage.

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text V, decide whether the following items are right C or wrong E.

The word “sleuth" is used in a disparaging way.

Considering the grammatical and semantic aspects of text V, decide whether the following items are right C or wrong E.

From the author’s account, it can be inferred that the plot of My Fair Lady is an homage to British social class structure.