Suponha que a oferta de certo bem é infinitamente elástica ao preço de R$ 5, e que a demanda deste bem é representada por:

D = 12 - 2 P.

onde P é o preço. Então:

Item 3 - Do ponto de vista social o governo deve utilizar uma taxa menor que 1/2.

Considere o seguinte problema de otimização condicionada:

!$ \begin{cases}Max_{x,y,z}&Q(x,y,z)=3xy+z^2\\s.a&x^2+y^2+z^2=81 \end{cases} !$

Julgue a afirmativa abaixo:

Item 2 - O ponto (0, 0, 9) satisfaz as condições de segunda ordem.

Part II

Recruitment of Labour for the Mills in The Early Factory Masters - Transition of the Factory in the Midlands Textile Industry. By Stanley Chapman. Chapter 9 - pp 156-157.

One of the most difficult problems which entrepreneurs in the early cotton and worsted-spinning industry had to face was the recruitment and retention of a labour force. The problem was, in part, a consequence of the well-known reluctance of the working-classes to enter the factories, and certainly the domestic framework knitters and weavers of the region were not easily persuaded to exchange their freedom for factory discipline. The scarcity of labour was also a reflection of the general shortage in the manufacturing districts. The hosiery and lace industries were growing very rapidly, and their expansion coincided with that of the spinning industry. Wages appear to have been higher in hosiery and lace than for similar grades of workers (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) in the mills. In the rural areas, there was a steady drain of good workers to the towns and large manufacturing villages, where the best-paid work was to be found. The French war also aggravated the labour shortage after 1792 by drawing large numbers of men into the army.

It has already been noted that the wages paid in the spinning-mills were not sufficiently high to attract workers from regular employment in the towns. Farey points out that Derbyshire millworkers earned higher wages than farm labourers in the country and White records that, in Bakewell, 'wages were raised immediately' after Arkwright's mill began production there. Fitton and Wadsworth suggest that Arkwright and Strutt did not employ parish apprentices, and that their labour force was probably recruited in the villages within a four- or five-mile radius of the factories. This explanation is not very convincing since other evidence, overlooked by these two authors, shows that even juvenile and female labour had to be brought into Derbyshire from the main centres of the cotton industry at Manchester and Nottingham.

The author states that:

Item 0 - the wages paid in the spinning mills were very high.

Com relação à Estatística Descritiva, podemos afirmar que:

Item 1 - sob condições de regularidade usuais, se quisermos minimizar a soma do quadrado dos desvios em relação a um determinado parâmetro, esse parâmetro é a média da distribuição.

Part II

Recruitment of Labour for the Mills in The Early Factory Masters - Transition of the Factory in the Midlands Textile Industry. By Stanley Chapman. Chapter 9 - pp 156-157.

One of the most difficult problems which entrepreneurs in the early cotton and worsted-spinning industry had to face was the recruitment and retention of a labour force. The problem was, in part, a consequence of the well-known reluctance of the working-classes to enter the factories, and certainly the domestic framework knitters and weavers of the region were not easily persuaded to exchange their freedom for factory discipline. The scarcity of labour was also a reflection of the general shortage in the manufacturing districts. The hosiery and lace industries were growing very rapidly, and their expansion coincided with that of the spinning industry. Wages appear to have been higher in hosiery and lace than for similar grades of workers (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) in the mills. In the rural areas, there was a steady drain of good workers to the towns and large manufacturing villages, where the best-paid work was to be found. The French war also aggravated the labour shortage after 1792 by drawing large numbers of men into the army.

It has already been noted that the wages paid in the spinning-mills were not sufficiently high to attract workers from regular employment in the towns. Farey points out that Derbyshire millworkers earned higher wages than farm labourers in the country and White records that, in Bakewell, 'wages were raised immediately' after Arkwright's mill began production there. Fitton and Wadsworth suggest that Arkwright and Strutt did not employ parish apprentices, and that their labour force was probably recruited in the villages within a four- or five-mile radius of the factories. This explanation is not very convincing since other evidence, overlooked by these two authors, shows that even juvenile and female labour had to be brought into Derbyshire from the main centres of the cotton industry at Manchester and Nottingham.

The author also argues that:

Item 3 - the working-classes were willing to exchange their freedom for better wages.

Uma firma usa 10 unidades de trabalho e 20 unidades de capital para produzir 10 unidades de produto. O produto marginal do trabalho é 0,5. Se existe retornos constantes de escala o produto marginal do capital deve ser:

Item 2 - não é possível calcular com a informação disponível

Parte I.

Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries by Harold Alderman and Christina H. Paxson. In Economics in a Changing World Edited by Edmar L. Bacha

Income risk is a central feature of rural areas of developing countries. A major topic in development economics is how well households are able to mitigate the adverse effects of income risk. There are several sensible reasons why households will not be able to fully insure consumption against income fluctuations. The well-known problems of moral hazard, information asymmetries, and deficiencies in the ability to enforce contracts may result in incomplete or absent insurance markets. The dearth of formal insurance markets in developing countries is evidence that these problems are considerable. However, a large body of literature indicates that households in developing countries make use of a wide variety of mechanisms, often informal, to at least partially limit consumption risk. A key piece of information required to guide policy design is how, and how well, different households mitigate risk. This paper reviews various strategies for insuring consumption against income fluctuations, and examines evidence on how effectively these strategies work.

There is a wide range of possible strategies to mitigate risk. We offer two broad classifications for consideration:

Risk management. In the absence of perfect insurance markets, households may undertake actions to reduce the variability of income. Within agriculture this might include crop and field diversification. Households might also limit income risk by choosing a diverse portfolio of occupations, or through the strategic migration of family members. The optimal amount of diversification will depend on the household's preferences towards risk, its ability to smooth consumption against income fluctuations, and the costs of diversification in the form of reduced average incomes.

Risk coping. Risk-coping strategies can be classified as those that smooth consumption intertemporally, through saving behaviour, and those that smooth consumption across households, through risk-sharing. The primary distinction between these two is that intertemporal smooothing enables a household to spread the effects of income shocks on consumption forward through time. Risk-sharing, by contrast, spreads the effects of income shocks across households at any one point in time. A wide variety of mechanisms may be used for both intertemporal consumption smoothing and risk-sharing. Intertemporal smoothing may be accomplished through borrowing and lending in formal or informal markets, accumulating and selling assets, and storing goods for future consumption. Risk-sharing arrangements may be accomplished through formal institutions, such a insurance and futures markets, and forward contracts for harvests, and informal mechanisms, including state-contingent transfers and remittances between friends and neighbours. These are also a number of institutions that may offer 'disguised' insurance. For example, share tenancy, credit contracts with state-contingent repayments, and long-term labour contracts may each contain an insurance component, although none are explicitly insurance contracts.

The authors argue that intertemporal consumption smoothing may be done by the household through:

Item 0 - saving and diversifying its investment portfolio.

Em relação à teoria de mercado, assinalar se a assertiva abaixo é verdadeira ou falsa:

Item 1 - Firmas com tecnologia !$ f(k,l)=k^{1/3}l^{1/6} !$ concorrem perfeitamente em uma economia onde o ingresso na indústria tem custo de R$ 3. Os preços unitários de k e l são R$ 2 e R$ 1, respectivamente. Então, o preço de equilíbrio em concorrência perfeita de longo prazo é R$ 6.

Suponha que para um consumidor a elasticidade-preço da demanda ordinária de Marshall pelo bem X (um dos bens que ele consome) é menor do que -1. Logo, um aumento no preço de X:

Item 2 - reduzirá sua demanda de X e aumentará a demanda de pelo menos um outro bem

Para as afirmações abaixo x e y são vetores em !$ \mathbb{R}^3 !$ e !$ \alpha !$ é um número real arbitrário. Indique se a asserta abaixo é falsa ou verdadeira.

Item 1 - A norma de um vetor é sempre maior ou igual a zero.