BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THAT FOLLOWS, DETERMINE IF EVERY STATEMENT IS RIGHT OR WRONG.

THIRD TEXT

As dramatic as it was, the global financial crises of 1997-99 was only the most recent of a rash of crises that have devastated market economies over the last 25 years. By one calculation almost 100 countries experienced a severe currency or financial crisis during that period, with adverse consequences for their national budgets and economic growth. Such patterns clearly call for an explanation: although there has been no dearth of suggestions, a consensus is growing that at least part of the explanation lies in weak financial institutions, which result in part from inadequate government regulation. The pendulum has come full circle: from the burst of enthusiasm over deregulation, policymakers now appreciate why it is that the most successful economies have long had a strong tradition of financial regulation. In the Unites States financial regulation dates back to 1863, in the middle of the American Civil War, when it became apparent that a strong banking system was essential to create a new national economy and that such a system required a strong national regulatory structure. The most recent major lapse in regulation, the deregulation effort that began in 1981, led to the savings and loan debacle. The consequences of that crisis were so severe that the U.S. economy did not recover for close to a decade.

But many developing countries are struggling with precisely the opposite problem – an overregulated financial system that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs, stunting the growth of even well-established firms. One of the many adverse effects of the East Asian financial crisis is that countries have become wary of reforms that affect the financial sector, aware that they may leave the country worse off. This article argues that reforms are possible – and indeed needed – and can be undertaken without undue fear, but success requires understanding the basic principles of financial sector regulation. The article sets forth those principles.

Even before the crisis, a theoretical literature argued that the nature of financial market failures necessitated a strong role for government. Failures in the banking system have strong spillovers, or externalities, that reach well beyond the individuals and firms directly involved. To avoid a financial collapse, governments typically bail out the affected entity, whether or not formal deposit insurance is in place; this intervention itself gives rise to problems of moral hazard. Although the absence of formal deposit insurance might give depositors a slightly increased incentive to monitor financial institutions (because there is some uncertainty about whether they will actually be bailed out), individual monitoring is actually inefficient. Monitoring is a public good, and it needs to be publicly provided. Of course, at a more practical level, a small depositor cannot be expected to examine the books of a bank on a weekly basis; there is strong evidence that regulators and rating agencies have difficulties doing so. Indeed, the widespread misconceptions about the appropriate strategy for regulating the financial sector suggests that even so-called experts are not fully aware of some of the key issues. Why, then, should one expect more from an individual depositor with little training, interest, or capacity in the arcane details of financial accounting?

Despite its long history, financial market regulation is poorly understood, as evidenced by the disasters associate with deregulation in industrial and developing countries. Often such measures were pushed through a burst of enthusiasm for free markets without recognizing the inherent market failures associate with such markets. Today few economists advocate unregulated banking, but a similar ideological agenda has pushed excessive reliance on a single regulatory instrument – capital adequacy standards. The belief is that this measure entails the minimal interference with the workings of the market and avoids the well-recognized problems of unregulated banks. A deeper analysis of the financial sector, however, shows that such reliance is not only inefficient but may even be counterproductive under some circumstances.

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach. Joseph E. Stiglitz. The World Bank

Research Observer, vol. 16, nº 1, Spring 2001.

According to the text:

Item 4 - Insurance of bank deposits induces depositors to closely monitor banks.

A partir de 1968, tanto o produto global como os produtos setoriais apresentaram extraordinário crescimento. O PIB real cresceu à taxa média de 11,2% ao ano e o da indústria de transformação, 13,3% ao ano. Relativamente a esse período, conhecido como o do 'milagre brasileiro', é correto afirmar:

Item 3 - A estratégia de crescimento do 'milagre' admitiu o convívio com a inflação. Na verdade, esta só não escapou ao controle graças a um forte arrocho salarial.

Há mais de uma década a economia brasileira vem se abrindo ao exterior. A abertura iniciou-se timidamente no final da década de 1980, transformou-se em estratégia oficial no início da década de 1990 e continua a ocorrer, com adaptações, até o presente. A natureza e os impactos da abertura nos permitem afirmar que:

Item 3 - A abertura e a internacionalização da indústria facilitaram o acesso ao conhecimento tecnológico e gerencial do exterior e propiciaram uma explosão, no País, da pesquisa científica e tecnológica, apoiada nos esforços do setor privado.

Considere a função !$ F : \Re^3 \rightarrow \Re !$ diferenciável !$ \nabla F(x) !$ denotando o gradiente de !$ F !$ no ponto !$ x ∈ \Re^3 !$. Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 3 - Dados o plano !$ L = \{(x_1, x_2, x_3) ∈ \Re^3; x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 7\} !$ e a superfície !$ H = \{(x_1, x_2, x_3) ∈ \Re^3; F(x_1, x_2, x_3) = 7\} !$, sabe-se que o plano !$ L !$ é tangente à superfície !$ H !$ no ponto (1,3,3). Isto posto, se !$ F !$ for estritamente convexa, então, se !$ F(x) > 7 !$ para todo ponto !$ x ∈ L, x ≠ (1,3,3) !$.

Indique se a afirmação está certo ou errado:

Item 2 - Quando um indivíduo transfere recursos da conta corrente para a caderneta de poupança, há destruição de meios de pagamento.

Considere a função !$ U : \Re^2 \rightarrow \Re !$ definida por !$ U(x,y) = min \{2x,y\} !$. Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 1 - O valor máximo de !$ U !$ no conjunto !$ B = \{ (x,y) ∈ \Re^2; x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, x^2 + y^2 ≤ 25\} !$ é maior que 5.

Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 4 - !$ \int_0^3 { \large x \over 1 + x^2} dx < 1 !$.

Considere a expansão de Taylor até o termo de quinta ordem, em torno do ponto !$ x = 0 !$. Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 1 - !$ ln(1 + x) \cong x - { \large x^2 \over 2} + { \large x^3 \over 3} - { \large x^4 \over 4} + { \large x^5 \over 5} !$.

Considere a expansão de Taylor até o termo de quinta ordem, em torno do ponto !$ x = 0 !$. Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 0 - !$ e^x = \cong 1 + x + { \large x^2 \over 2} + { \large x^3 \over 6} + { \large x^4 \over 24} + { \large x^5 \over 120} !$.

A respeito do subconjunto A, B, C e D definido abaixo, no !$ \Re^2 !$, responda C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 4 - !$ D ⊂ A !$