Foram encontradas 385 questões.
Considere o problema do investidor que pode investir os pesos !$ w_1 !$ e !$ w_2 !$ de sua riqueza em dois instrumentos financeiros arriscados. Suas preferências implicam que ele quer maximizar a função
!$ U (w_1,w_2) = 1,15w_1 + 1,2w_2 - 0,5 (0,04w_1^2 + 0,09w_2^2) !$.
Sujeita às restrições:
!$ w_1 + w_2 = 1 !$,
!$ w_1 ≥ 0 !$ e !$ w_2 ≥ 0 !$.
Julgue o item abaixo como certo ou errado.
Item 1 - O gradiente de !$ U !$ é !$ \left ( { \large 115 \over 100} - { \large 4 \over 100} w_1, { \large 12 \over 10} - { \large 9 \over 100}w_2\right) !$.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Russia and NATO
Outgunned
The Atlantic alliance faces superior conventional forces near Russia’s borders
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
BOASTING about nuclear weapons is something Vladimir Putin clearly enjoys. In his annual stateof- the-nation speech on March 1st, he listed five new weapons. Russia’s president gave pride of place to the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile with, in effect, unlimited range, which was guaranteed to thwart America’s missile defences (see Science). He got the headlines he wanted, though there is nothing new about Russia being able to devastate America with nuclear weapons, nor anything likely to change on that front. What should concern Europe more than Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling are the formidable conventional forces that Russia is steadily building up, particularly in the Baltic region.
On most measures, NATO appears comfortably ahead of Russia. Between them, America and its European NATO allies spent $871bn on defence in 2015, compared with Russia’s $52bn. But as a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues, the reality on the ground is rather different. It finds that Russia would now enjoy significant local superiority in any confrontation with NATO close to its own border. NATO’s latent strengths, once they were brought to bear, would be too much for Russia to cope with. But in the early stages of a conflict, for at least the first month and possibly for a good deal longer, the alliance would find itself outnumbered, outranged and outgunned.
Since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has bolstered its forces in the Baltic region with what it calls its “enhanced forward presence”. By last summer, the alliance had a total of 4,530 troops near the border with Russia in four battle-groups led by Germany (in Lithuania), Britain (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia) and the United States (in Poland). But, in accord with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an anachronistic agreement that reflected a more optimistic time, the soldiers are not permanently based, but constantly rotate.
NATO has also beefed up its “very high readiness joint task-force” of about 5,000 more troops who can be deployed within a week. But it admits that neither force is more than a tripwire to convince Russia that any attack on them would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole.
Over the past decade, Western forces and their Russian counterparts have diverged in terms of capability. NATO members adjusted for counter-insurgency operations in places such as Afghanistan by restructuring with light expeditionary forces. Russia concentrated on rebuilding forces with the mobility and firepower to wage high-intensity warfare against a peer adversary. As part of a comprehensive effort at military reform following a disjointed performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia has professionalised its forces (largely relegating conscripts to a second echelon), equipped them with modern heavy weapons, and honed them with frequent large-scale exercises and combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
What worries NATO commanders, such as General Sir Nicholas Carter, chief of Britain’s general staff, and his American opposite number, General Mark Milley, is the sheer amount of combat power Russia can concentrate at very short notice in the Baltic region. RAND found that in main battle tanks, Russia would outnumber NATO by 5.9 to 1; in infantry fighting vehicles by 4.6 to 1; in rocket artillery by 270 to none. And while NATO would enjoy a substantial advantage in combat aircraft, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced when faced with the world’s most powerful integrated theatre air defences.
Russia’s edge over NATO, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is increased by its ability to use its internal lines to reinforce at speed. By contrast, NATO has neglected to preserve its cold-war military-transport infrastructure. Bridges cannot take the weight of tanks, and rail systems are not designed for trucks carrying heavy armour.
There is plenty that NATO could do to enhance conventional deterrence. It could permanently station forces in the Baltic region with more hitting power; it could hold regular large-scale short-notice exercises; it could invest in strengthening its internal lines; individual member countries could do more to meet their spending obligations and use the money to restructure their ground forces for high-intensity conflict.
Whether NATO is capable of such focus is debatable. Its southern members worry more about refugee flows; France is fighting an insurgency in the Sahel; Germany’s new coalition agreement relegated the (wretched) state of its armed forces to page 156 of a 177-page document. Mr Putin’s priorities are very different.
NATO`s joint taskforce
Item 3 - is the only NATO force that can face Russia
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
O período do Estado Novo (1937-1945) pode ser considerado como de aprofundamento da atuação do Estado sobre os rumos da economia brasileira. A este período podemos associar:
Item 3 - A Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, que conferia autonomia a sindicatos para negociar convenções coletivas sobre questões trabalhistas com os sindicatos patronais.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Russia and NATO
Outgunned
The Atlantic alliance faces superior conventional forces near Russia’s borders
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
BOASTING about nuclear weapons is something Vladimir Putin clearly enjoys. In his annual stateof- the-nation speech on March 1st, he listed five new weapons. Russia’s president gave pride of place to the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile with, in effect, unlimited range, which was guaranteed to thwart America’s missile defences (see Science). He got the headlines he wanted, though there is nothing new about Russia being able to devastate America with nuclear weapons, nor anything likely to change on that front. What should concern Europe more than Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling are the formidable conventional forces that Russia is steadily building up, particularly in the Baltic region.
On most measures, NATO appears comfortably ahead of Russia. Between them, America and its European NATO allies spent $871bn on defence in 2015, compared with Russia’s $52bn. But as a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues, the reality on the ground is rather different. It finds that Russia would now enjoy significant local superiority in any confrontation with NATO close to its own border. NATO’s latent strengths, once they were brought to bear, would be too much for Russia to cope with. But in the early stages of a conflict, for at least the first month and possibly for a good deal longer, the alliance would find itself outnumbered, outranged and outgunned.
Since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has bolstered its forces in the Baltic region with what it calls its “enhanced forward presence”. By last summer, the alliance had a total of 4,530 troops near the border with Russia in four battle-groups led by Germany (in Lithuania), Britain (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia) and the United States (in Poland). But, in accord with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an anachronistic agreement that reflected a more optimistic time, the soldiers are not permanently based, but constantly rotate.
NATO has also beefed up its “very high readiness joint task-force” of about 5,000 more troops who can be deployed within a week. But it admits that neither force is more than a tripwire to convince Russia that any attack on them would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole.
Over the past decade, Western forces and their Russian counterparts have diverged in terms of capability. NATO members adjusted for counter-insurgency operations in places such as Afghanistan by restructuring with light expeditionary forces. Russia concentrated on rebuilding forces with the mobility and firepower to wage high-intensity warfare against a peer adversary. As part of a comprehensive effort at military reform following a disjointed performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia has professionalised its forces (largely relegating conscripts to a second echelon), equipped them with modern heavy weapons, and honed them with frequent large-scale exercises and combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
What worries NATO commanders, such as General Sir Nicholas Carter, chief of Britain’s general staff, and his American opposite number, General Mark Milley, is the sheer amount of combat power Russia can concentrate at very short notice in the Baltic region. RAND found that in main battle tanks, Russia would outnumber NATO by 5.9 to 1; in infantry fighting vehicles by 4.6 to 1; in rocket artillery by 270 to none. And while NATO would enjoy a substantial advantage in combat aircraft, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced when faced with the world’s most powerful integrated theatre air defences.
Russia’s edge over NATO, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is increased by its ability to use its internal lines to reinforce at speed. By contrast, NATO has neglected to preserve its cold-war military-transport infrastructure. Bridges cannot take the weight of tanks, and rail systems are not designed for trucks carrying heavy armour.
There is plenty that NATO could do to enhance conventional deterrence. It could permanently station forces in the Baltic region with more hitting power; it could hold regular large-scale short-notice exercises; it could invest in strengthening its internal lines; individual member countries could do more to meet their spending obligations and use the money to restructure their ground forces for high-intensity conflict.
Whether NATO is capable of such focus is debatable. Its southern members worry more about refugee flows; France is fighting an insurgency in the Sahel; Germany’s new coalition agreement relegated the (wretched) state of its armed forces to page 156 of a 177-page document. Mr Putin’s priorities are very different.
From the text,
Item 2 - NATO's cold war military-transport infrastructure has been maintained;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Sobre os debates a respeito da evolução da indústria brasileira a partir dos anos 1990, podemos dizer:
Item 1 - A modernização de segmentos específicos da indústria brasileira foi muito favorecida pelo processo de privatização de alguns setores, como o elétrico, que graças a tal processo foi capaz de gerar uma capacidade adequada de oferta à expansão do investimento privado industrial.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Russia and NATO
Outgunned
The Atlantic alliance faces superior conventional forces near Russia’s borders
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
BOASTING about nuclear weapons is something Vladimir Putin clearly enjoys. In his annual stateof- the-nation speech on March 1st, he listed five new weapons. Russia’s president gave pride of place to the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile with, in effect, unlimited range, which was guaranteed to thwart America’s missile defences (see Science). He got the headlines he wanted, though there is nothing new about Russia being able to devastate America with nuclear weapons, nor anything likely to change on that front. What should concern Europe more than Mr Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling are the formidable conventional forces that Russia is steadily building up, particularly in the Baltic region.
On most measures, NATO appears comfortably ahead of Russia. Between them, America and its European NATO allies spent $871bn on defence in 2015, compared with Russia’s $52bn. But as a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues, the reality on the ground is rather different. It finds that Russia would now enjoy significant local superiority in any confrontation with NATO close to its own border. NATO’s latent strengths, once they were brought to bear, would be too much for Russia to cope with. But in the early stages of a conflict, for at least the first month and possibly for a good deal longer, the alliance would find itself outnumbered, outranged and outgunned.
Since Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has bolstered its forces in the Baltic region with what it calls its “enhanced forward presence”. By last summer, the alliance had a total of 4,530 troops near the border with Russia in four battle-groups led by Germany (in Lithuania), Britain (in Estonia), Canada (in Latvia) and the United States (in Poland). But, in accord with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an anachronistic agreement that reflected a more optimistic time, the soldiers are not permanently based, but constantly rotate.
NATO has also beefed up its “very high readiness joint task-force” of about 5,000 more troops who can be deployed within a week. But it admits that neither force is more than a tripwire to convince Russia that any attack on them would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole.
Over the past decade, Western forces and their Russian counterparts have diverged in terms of capability. NATO members adjusted for counter-insurgency operations in places such as Afghanistan by restructuring with light expeditionary forces. Russia concentrated on rebuilding forces with the mobility and firepower to wage high-intensity warfare against a peer adversary. As part of a comprehensive effort at military reform following a disjointed performance in the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia has professionalised its forces (largely relegating conscripts to a second echelon), equipped them with modern heavy weapons, and honed them with frequent large-scale exercises and combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.
What worries NATO commanders, such as General Sir Nicholas Carter, chief of Britain’s general staff, and his American opposite number, General Mark Milley, is the sheer amount of combat power Russia can concentrate at very short notice in the Baltic region. RAND found that in main battle tanks, Russia would outnumber NATO by 5.9 to 1; in infantry fighting vehicles by 4.6 to 1; in rocket artillery by 270 to none. And while NATO would enjoy a substantial advantage in combat aircraft, their effectiveness would be greatly reduced when faced with the world’s most powerful integrated theatre air defences.
Russia’s edge over NATO, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is increased by its ability to use its internal lines to reinforce at speed. By contrast, NATO has neglected to preserve its cold-war military-transport infrastructure. Bridges cannot take the weight of tanks, and rail systems are not designed for trucks carrying heavy armour.
There is plenty that NATO could do to enhance conventional deterrence. It could permanently station forces in the Baltic region with more hitting power; it could hold regular large-scale short-notice exercises; it could invest in strengthening its internal lines; individual member countries could do more to meet their spending obligations and use the money to restructure their ground forces for high-intensity conflict.
Whether NATO is capable of such focus is debatable. Its southern members worry more about refugee flows; France is fighting an insurgency in the Sahel; Germany’s new coalition agreement relegated the (wretched) state of its armed forces to page 156 of a 177-page document. Mr Putin’s priorities are very different.
The text implies that:
Item 0 - Russia's forces in the Baltic region consist of nuclear weapons;
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Considere que !$ f(x) !$, !$ g(x) !$ e !$ h(x) !$são funções diferenciáveis e que tanto a expressão !$ { \large df(x) \over dx} !$ como a expressão !$ f'(x) !$ denotam a derivada da função !$ f(x) !$. Avalie a expressão abaixo quanto a sua veracidade:
Item 4 - Como !$ { \large d \over dx} [f(x)g(x)h(x)] = f'(x)g(x)h(x) + f(x)g'(x)h(x) + f(x)g(x)h'(x) !$, então !$ \textstyle \int_{a}^{b} f(x)g(x)h'(x)dx = [f(b)g(b)h(b) - f(a)g(a)h(a)] - \textstyle \int_{a}^{b} [f'(x)g(x)h(x) + f(x)g'(x)h(x)]dx. !$
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Based on your interpretation of the following text, determine whether each statement is right or wrong.
Text 1
Gangs of Stockholm
Sweden
STOCKHOLM
Young men with Kalashnikovs have upset Sweden’s sense of security
The Economist print edition | Europe
March 10th -16th 2018 |
IT WAS supposed to be a sneaky afternoon cigarette break. Then a gunman in black appeared and shot 15-year-old Robin Sinisalo in the head. His older brother Alejandro was shot four times. Robin died immediately on the doorstep of his home in north-west Stockholm. Alejandro was left in a wheelchair for life. Two years later, the boys’ mother, Carolina, says the police still have no leads.
Robin’s fate is increasingly common in Sweden. In 2011 only 17 people were killed by firearms. In 2017 the country had over 300 shootings, leaving 41 people dead and over 100 injured. The violence mostly stems from street gangs running small-time drug operations in big cities such as Stockholm, the capital, Malmö and Gothenburg. Gang members have even used hand grenades to attack police stations. Between 2010 and 2015, people were killed by illegal firearms at the same rate as in southern Italy. Though Sweden is still a relatively peaceful place, this is worrying.
Gangs are nothing new: bikers and Balkan mafiosi have traded drugs and occasional bullets in Sweden since the early 1990s. But the gangs emerging today are less organised and more prone to commit petty crime. Acquiring a legal gun requires strict screening, but Kalashnikovs from the Yugoslav wars are readily available on the black market. To sweeten the deal, smugglers often throw in hand grenades (there were 43 grenade incidents in Sweden last year). The victims and perpetrators of gang violence are nearly always young men.
How to explain the rise of gang violence? It cannot be the economy, which is doing well, or Sweden’s quality of life, which is among the best in the world. And crime in general is in decline. So what has gone wrong?
Some blame the refugee crisis of 2015, when Sweden took in the most asylum-seekers per capita in Europe. But shootings with illegal guns have been rising since the mid-2000s. Most gang members are indeed first- or second-generation immigrants—72% of them, according to one report, but they tend not to be new arrivals. It takes years for migrants to be settled enough to be sucked into crime, says Amir Rostami of Stockholm University. Sweden accepted lots of asylum-seekers in the 1980s and 1990s from countries like Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
Sweden built them homes and taught them its language, but it failed to integrate them into the labour market. The Swedish welfare system offers good education and generous benefits. But for immigrants there is little social mobility. Powerful unions insist on high wages for entry-level jobs, so firms often find it uneconomical to hire immigrants with limited education or not much Swedish. Today, 16% of people born abroad are unemployed—one of the highest rates in the OECD. Gangs offer frustrated young men an alternative. “They let you feel like a king, even if for one day,” says Mr Rostami.
Alarmed, the government has provided additional funding for integrating migrants, imposed harsher punishments for gun crimes and granted a weapons amnesty. Police have stepped up surveillance and co-operation with other European countries to curb weapons-smuggling. In January the Swedish government set up a centre to combat violent extremism.
Still, witnesses are scared to talk and the police are stretched. Not one firearm-homicide case in Stockholm was solved in 2016. The government hopes to turn that around: police wages have been bumped up, and officers who left during a reorganisation three years ago (which coincided with a rise in crime) have been re-hired. Preliminary results for 2017 show that the clear-up rate for firearm murders has risen to a (still woeful) 30% in Stockholm. But over100 cases remain unsolved.
Swedish politicians can no longer ignore the problem, especially so close to an election in September. Carolina Sinisalo has toured Sweden to raise awareness of gun violence. She says she thinks about moving elsewhere every day, “but this was Robin’s home. I can’t leave”.
The following conclusion can be drawn from the text:
Item 4 - Unions help find jobs for immigrants by accepting lower wages for entry-level jobs.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Uma firma A oferta seu produto em um mercado competitivo ao preço de P=$16, mas sua produção gera externalidades negativas sobre uma firma B em outro mercado na forma de emissão de um poluente. Cada unidade produzida do bem gera uma unidade de poluente, que é um mal. Especificamente, a função de custo privado da firma A é C(q)=q2, mas o custo social é dado por CS(q)=q3/3. Julgue o item a seguir:
Item 1 - Pode-se fazer a firma A produzir a quantidade socialmente eficiente fazendo-se incidir sobre ela um imposto pigouviano igual a t=$4.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Considere o Modelo de Crescimento de Solow aplicado a uma economia cuja função de produção é dada por Y=K1/2(AN)1/2, em que Y é o produto, K é o estoque de capital, N é o número de trabalhadores e A é o estado da tecnologia. A taxa de poupança é igual a 14%, a taxa de depreciação é igual a 8%, o número de trabalhadores cresce 2% ao ano e a taxa de progresso tecnológico é de 4% ao ano. Com base nestas informações, julgue a seguinte afirmativa como certo (C) ou errado (E):
Item 2 - A taxa de crescimento do produto é 6%.
Provas
Questão presente nas seguintes provas
Cadernos
Caderno Container