An institution is a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors’ socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works. This does not mean that institutions are not real or objective, that they are “nothing but” beliefs. As collective knowledge, they are experienced as having an existence “over and above” the individuals who happen to embody them at the moment. In this way, institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they are still a function of what actors collectively “know”.

Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it. In: International Organization, vol. 46, n.o 2, 1992, p. 395.

Com base no texto acima e considerando as instituições e suas características, assinale a opção correta.

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In the first line of the text, the word “crash” means

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

The last sentence of the text has been left with two blank spaces. Choose the option below that contains the correct sequence of words that fill in the blanks, keeping the main ideas of the text.

“For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.”

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In the sentence “He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation”, “rooted” and “to garner” mean, respectively,

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In accordance with the previous text, judge — right (C) or wrong (E) — the item below.

The word “Unlike” introduces the notion that Pombal’s and Salazar’s view on progress differed.

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In accordance with the previous text, judge — right (C) or wrong (E) — the item below.

Salazar’s support in the south of Portugal derived from the fact that landowners believed that if communists came to power they would confiscate their land.

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In accordance with the previous text, judge — right (C) or wrong (E) — the item below.

Land owners feared Salazar would freeze their properties.

Text for question

Unlike Pombal, who had used the power of the state to ruthlessly force through a crash program of modernization, Salazar froze Portugal’s economic and social patterns. “We are antiparliamentarians, antidemocrats, antiliberals”, Salazar said in 1936. “We are opposed to all forms of internationalism, communism, socialism, syndicalism.” To govern, he said, without apology, “is to protect the people from themselves”.

Yet Salazar enjoyed sizable support. He had rooted his regime sufficiently in Portuguese social realities to garner for it a small measure of popular approbation. The church and the small landholders of the heavily Catholic north backed him. So did the latifundiários, the owners of big farming estates in the central and southern regions who feared a loss of their holdings if the left took power. The outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, formed in 1921, was especially strong in the south.

But Salazar could not freeze the world. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to “conquer or die”. In Africa, as the French and British were freeing their colonies, African nationalist guerrillas rose up against the Portuguese in Angola (1961), Guinea (1962), and Mozambique (1964).

Portugal was the last European power in Africa to cling tenaciously to the panoply of formal domination. This was no accident. For a long time Portugal very successfully disguised the nature of her presence a skilful amalgam of historical mythmaking, claims multiracialism, and good public relations.

Adapted from Kenneth Maxwell. The making of portuguese democracy. CUP, 1997, p.18-9.

In accordance with the previous text, judge — right (C) or wrong (E) — the item below.

The setting free of the French and British colonies took place approximately at the same time as the fight for political freedom in some of the Portuguese African dominions.

Text for question

No burqa bans

Why is it nearly always wrong to outlaw
the wearing of the Muslim veil?

What you wear is a statement of who you are. From the old man’s cardigan and frayed tie to the youngster’s torn jeans plus lip-stud, dress stands for identity. For that reason laws on clothing should be avoided unless there is a compelling case for them. There is no such case for the Dutch government’s plan to outlaw the wearing in all public places of the face-covering burqa and niqab by Muslim women.

As it happens, the plan’s announcement by Rita Verdonk, the hardline Dutch immigration minister, was a political stunt aimed at reviving her party’s flagging fortunes before this week’s election. But a new Dutch government, when one is eventually formed, may still adopt it. And the proposed ban follows a big debate about the Muslim veil in many other European countries.

In 2004 France passed a law to stop the wearing of the Muslim hijab (headscarf) by girls in state schools. Several German states have banned teachers from wearing the headscarf. One Belgian town has outlawed the burqa and niqab from its streets. Recently a former British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, caused a row by inviting his Muslim constituents to remove their veils when they met him; and a lawsuit confirmed that British schools could sack teachers who wore face-covering garments. Turkey, a mostly Muslim country, has banned the wearing of the veil in public buildings ever since Ataturk established the modern republic in the 1920s.

Those who favour such bans put forward four main arguments. First, the veil (especially the burqa and niqab) shows a refusal by Muslims to integrate into broader society; Britain’s Tony Blair called it a “mark of separation”. Second, such clothing is testimony to the oppression of Muslim women; they are said to don veils largely at the behest (or command) of their domineering menfolk. Third, the display of religious symbols is an affront to secular societies (this line resonates especially in France and Turkey). And fourth, there are settings — the schoolroom, the courthouse — in which the wearing of Muslim veils can be intimidating or off-putting to pupils or juries.

Some of these arguments are stronger than others. But none supports a blanket Dutch-style ban. Muslim dress can indeed appear as a mark of separation, but racial and sectarian discrimination surely counts far more — and bans on religious clothing are likely to aggravate it. Oppression of female Muslims is regrettably common, and should be resisted; but many women choose to wear the veil for cultural reasons, and others do so (as they do in Arab countries) as a sign of emancipation, or even as a fashion statement. France and Turkey have fiercely secular traditions that can be interpreted to justify restrictions on religious symbols; but such restrictions are best applied sparingly, and only in state offices, not in the streets. Similarly, decisions to bar the wearing of Muslim dress courts or by teachers and pupils are surely better left local discretion than imposed nationally.

Adapted from No burqa bans. In: The Economist, Nov. 25th 2006, p. 15.

In the sentence “But none supports a blanket Dutch-style ban” the word “blanket” can be replaced, with no change in the meaning, by

Text for question

No burqa bans

Why is it nearly always wrong to outlaw
the wearing of the Muslim veil?

What you wear is a statement of who you are. From the old man’s cardigan and frayed tie to the youngster’s torn jeans plus lip-stud, dress stands for identity. For that reason laws on clothing should be avoided unless there is a compelling case for them. There is no such case for the Dutch government’s plan to outlaw the wearing in all public places of the face-covering burqa and niqab by Muslim women.

As it happens, the plan’s announcement by Rita Verdonk, the hardline Dutch immigration minister, was a political stunt aimed at reviving her party’s flagging fortunes before this week’s election. But a new Dutch government, when one is eventually formed, may still adopt it. And the proposed ban follows a big debate about the Muslim veil in many other European countries.

In 2004 France passed a law to stop the wearing of the Muslim hijab (headscarf) by girls in state schools. Several German states have banned teachers from wearing the headscarf. One Belgian town has outlawed the burqa and niqab from its streets. Recently a former British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, caused a row by inviting his Muslim constituents to remove their veils when they met him; and a lawsuit confirmed that British schools could sack teachers who wore face-covering garments. Turkey, a mostly Muslim country, has banned the wearing of the veil in public buildings ever since Ataturk established the modern republic in the 1920s.

Those who favour such bans put forward four main arguments. First, the veil (especially the burqa and niqab) shows a refusal by Muslims to integrate into broader society; Britain’s Tony Blair called it a “mark of separation”. Second, such clothing is testimony to the oppression of Muslim women; they are said to don veils largely at the behest (or command) of their domineering menfolk. Third, the display of religious symbols is an affront to secular societies (this line resonates especially in France and Turkey). And fourth, there are settings — the schoolroom, the courthouse — in which the wearing of Muslim veils can be intimidating or off-putting to pupils or juries.

Some of these arguments are stronger than others. But none supports a blanket Dutch-style ban. Muslim dress can indeed appear as a mark of separation, but racial and sectarian discrimination surely counts far more — and bans on religious clothing are likely to aggravate it. Oppression of female Muslims is regrettably common, and should be resisted; but many women choose to wear the veil for cultural reasons, and others do so (as they do in Arab countries) as a sign of emancipation, or even as a fashion statement. France and Turkey have fiercely secular traditions that can be interpreted to justify restrictions on religious symbols; but such restrictions are best applied sparingly, and only in state offices, not in the streets. Similarly, decisions to bar the wearing of Muslim dress courts or by teachers and pupils are surely better left local discretion than imposed nationally.

Adapted from No burqa bans. In: The Economist, Nov. 25th 2006, p. 15.

In accordance with the previous text, judge — right (C) or wrong (E) — the item below.

In the text, “secular” is the same as non-religious.