Withdrawal of a Diplomatic Mission

The recall of an entire diplomatic mission, whether on a temporary or on an indefinite basis, without breach of diplomatic relations between sending and receiving States, is now a relatively frequent procedure. Recall may take place for political, economic or security reasons. In all cases the two States remain formally in diplomatic relations and there are no constraints in their contacts at international conferences or organisations or in third States. Normally, it is hoped that a permanent diplomatic mission may be reestablished under more favourable circumstances, and this is more straightforward when no formal breach of relations has taken place. Formal breach is usually very difficult to reverse quickly, even if the reason for it has disappeared. In 1956, for example, Saudi Arabia broke relations with the United Kingdom and France on 6 November, one day before the cease-fire which brought an end to their intervention in Suez, but relations were not restored between Saudi Arabia and either State until 1962.

I. Roberts (org.). Satow’s Diplomatic Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 215, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary of the text above, decide whether the statements below are right (C) or wrong (E).

The expression “there are no constraints in their contacts” means that their contacts remain regular.

Withdrawal of a Diplomatic Mission

The recall of an entire diplomatic mission, whether on a temporary or on an indefinite basis, without breach of diplomatic relations between sending and receiving States, is now a relatively frequent procedure. Recall may take place for political, economic or security reasons. In all cases the two States remain formally in diplomatic relations and there are no constraints in their contacts at international conferences or organisations or in third States. Normally, it is hoped that a permanent diplomatic mission may be reestablished under more favourable circumstances, and this is more straightforward when no formal breach of relations has taken place. Formal breach is usually very difficult to reverse quickly, even if the reason for it has disappeared. In 1956, for example, Saudi Arabia broke relations with the United Kingdom and France on 6 November, one day before the cease-fire which brought an end to their intervention in Suez, but relations were not restored between Saudi Arabia and either State until 1962.

I. Roberts (org.). Satow’s Diplomatic Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 215, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary of the text above, decide whether the statements below are right (C) or wrong (E).

The “sending State” is the one capable of expelling foreign diplomats from its territory.

“Certain broader conditions must also be borne in mind when one considers the future of foreign service work. Among the most significant has been the extreme fragmentation of American policy-making and diplomacy in recent years.

Effective diplomacy in the traditional European sense, up through the French Revolution and even later, rested on the assumption that the diplomat, in speaking to the government to which he was accredited, was speaking for the supreme source of power in his own country and would be backed up by its authority in anything he undertook to say in its name. This in turn rested on the assumption that some single coherent and responsible center of power—a crowned head, a president, or an allpowerful prime minister—in the diplomat's own country was in a position to compel the country's other authorities to play their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process. This principle, known in German speaking countries as das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the precedence of foreign policy), was seen by monarchs and prime ministers of earlier ages as a sine qua non of successful diplomacy.

Application of this principle to a democratic society would always present difficulties, since it is plainly incompatible with the diffusion of authority that democratic rule usually requires. The incompatibility was bound to be particularly acute for the United States, where
the diffusion of political power is extensive even in comparison with other democracies. For example, because of the constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by the Senate, the chief executive has never been able to negotiate the text of a treaty without confessing that the other party could not rely on the wording unless and until it had passed muster in the Senate.

As the American political system matured and the powers of individual states, courts, and even municipal and local authorities gained acceptance, it gradually became clear that the federal government could not often speak for the country as a whole without consultation, and sometimes even negotiation, not only with Congress but with a host of other authorities or players. Entities with which accommodations had to be reached even came to include some private enterprises. The extreme diffusion of authority at home was bound to place limitations on the representation of America’s interests by its ambassadors (…) abroad”.

KENNAN, George F. Diplomacy without diplomats? Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, n. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1997, p. 204-205, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item

The word “acute” could be replaced with mutual without changing the meaning of the sentence.

“Certain broader conditions must also be borne in mind when one considers the future of foreign service work. Among the most significant has been the extreme fragmentation of American policy-making and diplomacy in recent years.

Effective diplomacy in the traditional European sense, up through the French Revolution and even later, rested on the assumption that the diplomat, in speaking to the government to which he was accredited, was speaking for the supreme source of power in his own country and would be backed up by its authority in anything he undertook to say in its name. This in turn rested on the assumption that some single coherent and responsible center of power—a crowned head, a president, or an allpowerful prime minister—in the diplomat's own country was in a position to compel the country's other authorities to play their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process. This principle, known in German speaking countries as das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the precedence of foreign policy), was seen by monarchs and prime ministers of earlier ages as a sine qua non of successful diplomacy.

Application of this principle to a democratic society would always present difficulties, since it is plainly incompatible with the diffusion of authority that democratic rule usually requires. The incompatibility was bound to be particularly acute for the United States, where
the diffusion of political power is extensive even in comparison with other democracies. For example, because of the constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by the Senate, the chief executive has never been able to negotiate the text of a treaty without confessing that the other party could not rely on the wording unless and until it had passed muster in the Senate.

As the American political system matured and the powers of individual states, courts, and even municipal and local authorities gained acceptance, it gradually became clear that the federal government could not often speak for the country as a whole without consultation, and sometimes even negotiation, not only with Congress but with a host of other authorities or players. Entities with which accommodations had to be reached even came to include some private enterprises. The extreme diffusion of authority at home was bound to place limitations on the representation of America’s interests by its ambassadors (…) abroad”.

KENNAN, George F. Diplomacy without diplomats? Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, n. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1997, p. 204-205, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item

Effective diplomacy in the traditional sense assumed that commitments made through the diplomatic process would be enforced by a single center of power in the diplomat’s own country, irrespective of any resistance from other domestic authorities.

“Certain broader conditions must also be borne in mind when one considers the future of foreign service work. Among the most significant has been the extreme fragmentation of American policy-making and diplomacy in recent years.

Effective diplomacy in the traditional European sense, up through the French Revolution and even later, rested on the assumption that the diplomat, in speaking to the government to which he was accredited, was speaking for the supreme source of power in his own country and would be backed up by its authority in anything he undertook to say in its name. This in turn rested on the assumption that some single coherent and responsible center of power—a crowned head, a president, or an allpowerful prime minister—in the diplomat's own country was in a position to compel the country's other authorities to play their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process. This principle, known in German speaking countries as das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the precedence of foreign policy), was seen by monarchs and prime ministers of earlier ages as a sine qua non of successful diplomacy.

Application of this principle to a democratic society would always present difficulties, since it is plainly incompatible with the diffusion of authority that democratic rule usually requires. The incompatibility was bound to be particularly acute for the United States, where
the diffusion of political power is extensive even in comparison with other democracies. For example, because of the constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by the Senate, the chief executive has never been able to negotiate the text of a treaty without confessing that the other party could not rely on the wording unless and until it had passed muster in the Senate.

As the American political system matured and the powers of individual states, courts, and even municipal and local authorities gained acceptance, it gradually became clear that the federal government could not often speak for the country as a whole without consultation, and sometimes even negotiation, not only with Congress but with a host of other authorities or players. Entities with which accommodations had to be reached even came to include some private enterprises. The extreme diffusion of authority at home was bound to place limitations on the representation of America’s interests by its ambassadors (…) abroad”.

KENNAN, George F. Diplomacy without diplomats? Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, n. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1997, p. 204-205, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item

Texts of treaties agreed upon by the American chief executive in an international negotiation might come to be later rejected or modified by the Senate of the United States.

“Certain broader conditions must also be borne in mind when one considers the future of foreign service work. Among the most significant has been the extreme fragmentation of American policy-making and diplomacy in recent years.

Effective diplomacy in the traditional European sense, up through the French Revolution and even later, rested on the assumption that the diplomat, in speaking to the government to which he was accredited, was speaking for the supreme source of power in his own country and would be backed up by its authority in anything he undertook to say in its name. This in turn rested on the assumption that some single coherent and responsible center of power—a crowned head, a president, or an allpowerful prime minister—in the diplomat's own country was in a position to compel the country's other authorities to play their part in meeting any commitments made through the diplomatic process. This principle, known in German speaking countries as das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the precedence of foreign policy), was seen by monarchs and prime ministers of earlier ages as a sine qua non of successful diplomacy.

Application of this principle to a democratic society would always present difficulties, since it is plainly incompatible with the diffusion of authority that democratic rule usually requires. The incompatibility was bound to be particularly acute for the United States, where
the diffusion of political power is extensive even in comparison with other democracies. For example, because of the constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by the Senate, the chief executive has never been able to negotiate the text of a treaty without confessing that the other party could not rely on the wording unless and until it had passed muster in the Senate.

As the American political system matured and the powers of individual states, courts, and even municipal and local authorities gained acceptance, it gradually became clear that the federal government could not often speak for the country as a whole without consultation, and sometimes even negotiation, not only with Congress but with a host of other authorities or players. Entities with which accommodations had to be reached even came to include some private enterprises. The extreme diffusion of authority at home was bound to place limitations on the representation of America’s interests by its ambassadors (…) abroad”.

KENNAN, George F. Diplomacy without diplomats? Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, n. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1997, p. 204-205, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item

As a consequence of the extreme fragmentation of American policy-making and diplomacy, ambassadors of the United States represent only the interests of the federal government abroad.

Text 5 to answer questions.

“Were not those behavior patterns and collective selfimages really the cultural property of an elite, and a small one at that, superimposed on the majority of the population?

[...].

In the sense that the collective ways of seeing themselves, and the world beyond, that I have classified as habitually Dutch were not a spontaneous generation but a conscious invention, and that the inventors belonged by and large to the educated, propertied nation, the objection is valid. Van Beverwijk, Cats, Grotius and many of the other projectors of the national imagination were not, by any account, men of the common herd. And it was they who gave shape, perspective and meaning to the rush of historical experience with which the Netherlanders were beset. They were, in a sense, the inventors of patriotic inevitability: the notion that a peculiar Dutch destiny lay immanent, locked in the crust of European history, waiting for some preordained eruption to blow it free of its ancient and unnatural containment. This was potent mythology, to be sure. But it would have been ephemeral, had it been just the self-serving fancy of a few humanist intellectuals and grandees. Its robustness, in fact, lay in the spell of selfrecognition. To be free and to deserve godly succor, the Dutch were told, they had merely to be themselves and to remain true to themselves.

To a remarkable degree, for its time, Dutch culture was the property of all sorts and social conditions. An Avercamp winterscape with gentlefolk skating alongside rustics and sober burghers is an idyll, no doubt, but not so very far from the truth. It was certainly more than a
conspiracy of false consciousness, a series of social fables devised to legitimate a monopoly of social power by the possessing classes. Of course, it didn’t do them any harm, either. But in the acid test of allegiance and sacrifice in a murderous and terrifying war, in the burden of heavy taxes, and in the perennial alarms and anxieties that hung around Dutch diplomacy, their belief in themselves as a common
tribe held firm.”

SCHAMA, Simon. The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age. London: Fontana, 1988, p. 566-567, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item.

Although conceived by a few local intellectuals and elite members, Dutch culture exerted an appeal over the rest of the country because the latter saw themselves reflected by those artistic expressions.

Text 5 to answer questions.

“Were not those behavior patterns and collective selfimages really the cultural property of an elite, and a small one at that, superimposed on the majority of the population?

[...].

In the sense that the collective ways of seeing themselves, and the world beyond, that I have classified as habitually Dutch were not a spontaneous generation but a conscious invention, and that the inventors belonged by and large to the educated, propertied nation, the objection is valid. Van Beverwijk, Cats, Grotius and many of the other projectors of the national imagination were not, by any account, men of the common herd. And it was they who gave shape, perspective and meaning to the rush of historical experience with which the Netherlanders were beset. They were, in a sense, the inventors of patriotic inevitability: the notion that a peculiar Dutch destiny lay immanent, locked in the crust of European history, waiting for some preordained eruption to blow it free of its ancient and unnatural containment. This was potent mythology, to be sure. But it would have been ephemeral, had it been just the self-serving fancy of a few humanist intellectuals and grandees. Its robustness, in fact, lay in the spell of selfrecognition. To be free and to deserve godly succor, the Dutch were told, they had merely to be themselves and to remain true to themselves.

To a remarkable degree, for its time, Dutch culture was the property of all sorts and social conditions. An Avercamp winterscape with gentlefolk skating alongside rustics and sober burghers is an idyll, no doubt, but not so very far from the truth. It was certainly more than a
conspiracy of false consciousness, a series of social fables devised to legitimate a monopoly of social power by the possessing classes. Of course, it didn’t do them any harm, either. But in the acid test of allegiance and sacrifice in a murderous and terrifying war, in the burden of heavy taxes, and in the perennial alarms and anxieties that hung around Dutch diplomacy, their belief in themselves as a common
tribe held firm.”

SCHAMA, Simon. The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age. London: Fontana, 1988, p. 566-567, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item.

The text admits that Dutch culture, understood as “collective ways of seeing themselves, and the world beyond”, was a conscious invention.

Text 5 to answer questions.

“Were not those behavior patterns and collective selfimages really the cultural property of an elite, and a small one at that, superimposed on the majority of the population?

[...].

In the sense that the collective ways of seeing themselves, and the world beyond, that I have classified as habitually Dutch were not a spontaneous generation but a conscious invention, and that the inventors belonged by and large to the educated, propertied nation, the objection is valid. Van Beverwijk, Cats, Grotius and many of the other projectors of the national imagination were not, by any account, men of the common herd. And it was they who gave shape, perspective and meaning to the rush of historical experience with which the Netherlanders were beset. They were, in a sense, the inventors of patriotic inevitability: the notion that a peculiar Dutch destiny lay immanent, locked in the crust of European history, waiting for some preordained eruption to blow it free of its ancient and unnatural containment. This was potent mythology, to be sure. But it would have been ephemeral, had it been just the self-serving fancy of a few humanist intellectuals and grandees. Its robustness, in fact, lay in the spell of selfrecognition. To be free and to deserve godly succor, the Dutch were told, they had merely to be themselves and to remain true to themselves.

To a remarkable degree, for its time, Dutch culture was the property of all sorts and social conditions. An Avercamp winterscape with gentlefolk skating alongside rustics and sober burghers is an idyll, no doubt, but not so very far from the truth. It was certainly more than a
conspiracy of false consciousness, a series of social fables devised to legitimate a monopoly of social power by the possessing classes. Of course, it didn’t do them any harm, either. But in the acid test of allegiance and sacrifice in a murderous and terrifying war, in the burden of heavy taxes, and in the perennial alarms and anxieties that hung around Dutch diplomacy, their belief in themselves as a common
tribe held firm.”

SCHAMA, Simon. The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age. London: Fontana, 1988, p. 566-567, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item.

The expression “propertied nation” refers to the sovereignty of the Dutch nation.

Text 5 to answer questions.

“Were not those behavior patterns and collective selfimages really the cultural property of an elite, and a small one at that, superimposed on the majority of the population?

[...].

In the sense that the collective ways of seeing themselves, and the world beyond, that I have classified as habitually Dutch were not a spontaneous generation but a conscious invention, and that the inventors belonged by and large to the educated, propertied nation, the objection is valid. Van Beverwijk, Cats, Grotius and many of the other projectors of the national imagination were not, by any account, men of the common herd. And it was they who gave shape, perspective and meaning to the rush of historical experience with which the Netherlanders were beset. They were, in a sense, the inventors of patriotic inevitability: the notion that a peculiar Dutch destiny lay immanent, locked in the crust of European history, waiting for some preordained eruption to blow it free of its ancient and unnatural containment. This was potent mythology, to be sure. But it would have been ephemeral, had it been just the self-serving fancy of a few humanist intellectuals and grandees. Its robustness, in fact, lay in the spell of selfrecognition. To be free and to deserve godly succor, the Dutch were told, they had merely to be themselves and to remain true to themselves.

To a remarkable degree, for its time, Dutch culture was the property of all sorts and social conditions. An Avercamp winterscape with gentlefolk skating alongside rustics and sober burghers is an idyll, no doubt, but not so very far from the truth. It was certainly more than a
conspiracy of false consciousness, a series of social fables devised to legitimate a monopoly of social power by the possessing classes. Of course, it didn’t do them any harm, either. But in the acid test of allegiance and sacrifice in a murderous and terrifying war, in the burden of heavy taxes, and in the perennial alarms and anxieties that hung around Dutch diplomacy, their belief in themselves as a common
tribe held firm.”

SCHAMA, Simon. The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age. London: Fontana, 1988, p. 566-567, with adaptations.

Considering the ideas and the vocabulary presented in the text, mark the following item.

The feeling that Dutch of all social conditions were part of a common group, whose experience was expressed by a common culture, was compromised by the participation in war and by the burden of taxes imposed by the Dutch government.