This text refers to item.

While there is no shortage of studies into the reasons why software projects fail (Ewusi-Mensah, 1997), the major risks of software development (Jones, 1994), or even the factors affecting project success (Cooke-Davies, 2002), the field of software engineering lacks a general model with which to investigate such failures. To date, studies have tended to be surveys of the factors thought to play some part in a failure.

Several researchers have argued that a simple model of accidents is insufficient for dealing with modern technology. A causal-chain model of accidents is useful to investigate the failure of a specific component through wear and tear, or the attribution of the cause can be established through application of a "but for" test. Given the cause, similar accidents can be prevented by checking the same component for wear and tear or other flaws such as structural cracks. However, it is a less useful model when investigating accidents which causes are ultimately not due to physical weaknesses but are due to interactions between components or the failure of the system itself.

Driven by the need to find ways to prevent future accidents, the alternative models reject the simple causal chain model on several grounds. The first is that looking back along the causal chain requires a "stopping rule" to determine when to cease investigating deeper into the system which, it is argued, can be somewhat arbitrary in the choice of cause (Leveson, 2004). The second reason is that such investigative techniques tend to focus attention on the proximate event most closely associated with the accident and direct attention away from the latent, contributory causes.

Where, in the past, it may have been sufficient to seek direct causes of an accident, modern socio-technical systems can produce accidents that are the result of the interaction of different parts of the system rather than a failure of any one part of the system. Turner & Pidgeon (1997) reviewed official investigations into non-natural disasters to arrive at a view that many disasters were man-made and entirely foreseeable. In a major contrast to causal models of accidents, the authors argued that the conditions for the disasters he investigated largely originated from decisions made by upper management.

The view that there was ample evidence of impending disaster available if only someone paid it any attention appears to be shared by investigators other than Turner. However such hindsight bias has been criticised by several researchers, most notably Dekker (2005). Hindsight bias ignores the reality that most operational decisions are made under ambiguous circumstances based on sparse and ambiguous evidence. Instead, Dekker argues, investigators must try hard to understand the circumstances of the time and put aside knowledge of the outcome.

To reason more fully about the interaction of different parts of a socio-technical system, several researchers have proposed a system theoretic model in which the system is expressed as a hierarchy of control levels. Each level of the hierarchy is considered to act on the level below it through the imposition of constraints and directions to achieve emergent properties and to receive feedback. A more useful model for considering total risk was a "top-down, systems oriented approach based on system control theoretic concepts". This approach gave a control structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. Such a model shows how different parties contribute to safety regardless of their organizational affiliations.

Judge the following items according to the text.

Accidents in software development projects and products are nothing new and neither are they likely to cease.

This text refers to item.

While there is no shortage of studies into the reasons why software projects fail (Ewusi-Mensah, 1997), the major risks of software development (Jones, 1994), or even the factors affecting project success (Cooke-Davies, 2002), the field of software engineering lacks a general model with which to investigate such failures. To date, studies have tended to be surveys of the factors thought to play some part in a failure.

Several researchers have argued that a simple model of accidents is insufficient for dealing with modern technology. A causal-chain model of accidents is useful to investigate the failure of a specific component through wear and tear, or the attribution of the cause can be established through application of a "but for" test. Given the cause, similar accidents can be prevented by checking the same component for wear and tear or other flaws such as structural cracks. However, it is a less useful model when investigating accidents which causes are ultimately not due to physical weaknesses but are due to interactions between components or the failure of the system itself.

Driven by the need to find ways to prevent future accidents, the alternative models reject the simple causal chain model on several grounds. The first is that looking back along the causal chain requires a "stopping rule" to determine when to cease investigating deeper into the system which, it is argued, can be somewhat arbitrary in the choice of cause (Leveson, 2004). The second reason is that such investigative techniques tend to focus attention on the proximate event most closely associated with the accident and direct attention away from the latent, contributory causes.

Where, in the past, it may have been sufficient to seek direct causes of an accident, modern socio-technical systems can produce accidents that are the result of the interaction of different parts of the system rather than a failure of any one part of the system. Turner & Pidgeon (1997) reviewed official investigations into non-natural disasters to arrive at a view that many disasters were man-made and entirely foreseeable. In a major contrast to causal models of accidents, the authors argued that the conditions for the disasters he investigated largely originated from decisions made by upper management.

The view that there was ample evidence of impending disaster available if only someone paid it any attention appears to be shared by investigators other than Turner. However such hindsight bias has been criticised by several researchers, most notably Dekker (2005). Hindsight bias ignores the reality that most operational decisions are made under ambiguous circumstances based on sparse and ambiguous evidence. Instead, Dekker argues, investigators must try hard to understand the circumstances of the time and put aside knowledge of the outcome.

To reason more fully about the interaction of different parts of a socio-technical system, several researchers have proposed a system theoretic model in which the system is expressed as a hierarchy of control levels. Each level of the hierarchy is considered to act on the level below it through the imposition of constraints and directions to achieve emergent properties and to receive feedback. A more useful model for considering total risk was a "top-down, systems oriented approach based on system control theoretic concepts". This approach gave a control structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. Such a model shows how different parties contribute to safety regardless of their organizational affiliations.

Judge the following items according to the text.

The current models employed to investigate software accidents do not appear to be suited to the task.

This text refers to item.

While there is no shortage of studies into the reasons why software projects fail (Ewusi-Mensah, 1997), the major risks of software development (Jones, 1994), or even the factors affecting project success (Cooke-Davies, 2002), the field of software engineering lacks a general model with which to investigate such failures. To date, studies have tended to be surveys of the factors thought to play some part in a failure.

Several researchers have argued that a simple model of accidents is insufficient for dealing with modern technology. A causal-chain model of accidents is useful to investigate the failure of a specific component through wear and tear, or the attribution of the cause can be established through application of a "but for" test. Given the cause, similar accidents can be prevented by checking the same component for wear and tear or other flaws such as structural cracks. However, it is a less useful model when investigating accidents which causes are ultimately not due to physical weaknesses but are due to interactions between components or the failure of the system itself.

Driven by the need to find ways to prevent future accidents, the alternative models reject the simple causal chain model on several grounds. The first is that looking back along the causal chain requires a "stopping rule" to determine when to cease investigating deeper into the system which, it is argued, can be somewhat arbitrary in the choice of cause (Leveson, 2004). The second reason is that such investigative techniques tend to focus attention on the proximate event most closely associated with the accident and direct attention away from the latent, contributory causes.

Where, in the past, it may have been sufficient to seek direct causes of an accident, modern socio-technical systems can produce accidents that are the result of the interaction of different parts of the system rather than a failure of any one part of the system. Turner & Pidgeon (1997) reviewed official investigations into non-natural disasters to arrive at a view that many disasters were man-made and entirely foreseeable. In a major contrast to causal models of accidents, the authors argued that the conditions for the disasters he investigated largely originated from decisions made by upper management.

The view that there was ample evidence of impending disaster available if only someone paid it any attention appears to be shared by investigators other than Turner. However such hindsight bias has been criticised by several researchers, most notably Dekker (2005). Hindsight bias ignores the reality that most operational decisions are made under ambiguous circumstances based on sparse and ambiguous evidence. Instead, Dekker argues, investigators must try hard to understand the circumstances of the time and put aside knowledge of the outcome.

To reason more fully about the interaction of different parts of a socio-technical system, several researchers have proposed a system theoretic model in which the system is expressed as a hierarchy of control levels. Each level of the hierarchy is considered to act on the level below it through the imposition of constraints and directions to achieve emergent properties and to receive feedback. A more useful model for considering total risk was a "top-down, systems oriented approach based on system control theoretic concepts". This approach gave a control structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. Such a model shows how different parties contribute to safety regardless of their organizational affiliations.

Judge the following items according to the text.

As Dekker has posed, investigators should focus on the circumstances of the time and disregard knowledge of the outcome.

Judge the following items according to the text.

A top-down systems oriented approach shows how different parties may contribute to safety, considering their organizational affiliations.

This text refers to item.

While there is no shortage of studies into the reasons why software projects fail (Ewusi-Mensah, 1997), the major risks of software development (Jones, 1994), or even the factors affecting project success (Cooke-Davies, 2002), the field of software engineering lacks a general model with which to investigate such failures. To date, studies have tended to be surveys of the factors thought to play some part in a failure.

Several researchers have argued that a simple model of accidents is insufficient for dealing with modern technology. A causal-chain model of accidents is useful to investigate the failure of a specific component through wear and tear, or the attribution of the cause can be established through application of a "but for" test. Given the cause, similar accidents can be prevented by checking the same component for wear and tear or other flaws such as structural cracks. However, it is a less useful model when investigating accidents which causes are ultimately not due to physical weaknesses but are due to interactions between components or the failure of the system itself.

Driven by the need to find ways to prevent future accidents, the alternative models reject the simple causal chain model on several grounds. The first is that looking back along the causal chain requires a "stopping rule" to determine when to cease investigating deeper into the system which, it is argued, can be somewhat arbitrary in the choice of cause (Leveson, 2004). The second reason is that such investigative techniques tend to focus attention on the proximate event most closely associated with the accident and direct attention away from the latent, contributory causes.

Where, in the past, it may have been sufficient to seek direct causes of an accident, modern socio-technical systems can produce accidents that are the result of the interaction of different parts of the system rather than a failure of any one part of the system. Turner & Pidgeon (1997) reviewed official investigations into non-natural disasters to arrive at a view that many disasters were man-made and entirely foreseeable. In a major contrast to causal models of accidents, the authors argued that the conditions for the disasters he investigated largely originated from decisions made by upper management.

The view that there was ample evidence of impending disaster available if only someone paid it any attention appears to be shared by investigators other than Turner. However such hindsight bias has been criticised by several researchers, most notably Dekker (2005). Hindsight bias ignores the reality that most operational decisions are made under ambiguous circumstances based on sparse and ambiguous evidence. Instead, Dekker argues, investigators must try hard to understand the circumstances of the time and put aside knowledge of the outcome.

To reason more fully about the interaction of different parts of a socio-technical system, several researchers have proposed a system theoretic model in which the system is expressed as a hierarchy of control levels. Each level of the hierarchy is considered to act on the level below it through the imposition of constraints and directions to achieve emergent properties and to receive feedback. A more useful model for considering total risk was a "top-down, systems oriented approach based on system control theoretic concepts". This approach gave a control structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. Such a model shows how different parties contribute to safety regardless of their organizational affiliations.

Judge the following items according to the text.

A causal-chain model of accidents is effective in investigating accidents which causes are solely due to failures of the system.

P: A quantidade de processos que cada analista recebeu é menor ou igual a 5;

Q: a + b + c = 10;

R: Um analista recebeu mais que 8 processos e os outros 2 receberam, juntos, um total de 4 processos;

S: Algum analista recebeu apenas 2 processos.

Com base nessas informações, julgue o item que se segue.

A proposição ¬Q é equivalente à proposição seguinte: Pelo menos um analista recebeu apenas um processo.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO X
Edital n.º 1-TJX, de 14 de janeiro de 2001
CONCURSO PÚBLICO PARA PROVIMENTO
DE CARGOS DE ANALISTA JUDICIÁRIO

O TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO X torna pública a autorização do Presidente do TJX para a realização de Concurso Público para Provimento de 200 cargos de Analista Judiciário criados pela Lei n.º 10.000, de 10 de dezembro de 2000, e de outros decorrentes de aposentadorias e vacâncias.

O Edital de Abertura de inscrição deverá ser publicado em Abril de 2001 e disporá sobre as normas de realização do concurso.

Joaquim José da Silva Xavier
Presidente do concurso

A partir do texto hipotético acima, julgue o item.

Trechos com informações vagas, como "e de outros decorrentes de aposentadorias e vacâncias", e com uso de tempo verbal de futuro, como "deverá ser publicado" e "disporá sobre", provocam falta de clareza e concisão, características estas que devem ser respeitadas nos documentos oficiais.

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO X
Edital n.º 1-TJX, de 14 de janeiro de 2001
CONCURSO PÚBLICO PARA PROVIMENTO
DE CARGOS DE ANALISTA JUDICIÁRIO

O TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO X torna pública a autorização do Presidente do TJX para a realização de Concurso Público para Provimento de 200 cargos de Analista Judiciário criados pela Lei n.º 10.000, de 10 de dezembro de 2000, e de outros decorrentes de aposentadorias e vacâncias.

O Edital de Abertura de inscrição deverá ser publicado em Abril de 2001 e disporá sobre as normas de realização do concurso.

Joaquim José da Silva Xavier
Presidente do concurso

A partir do texto hipotético acima, julgue o item.

Apesar de nomear o emissor do texto pelo nome próprio, o documento não fere o princípio da impessoalidade exigido nos documentos oficiais.