William Penn (1644-1718), founder of Pennsylvania. Son of an admiral, he was sent to a Puritan school and was expelled
from Oxford as a dissenter in 1660. Sent to Ireland to manage the family estates, he regularly attended the Quaker meeting at Cork,
and on his return to England he was twice imprisoned for proselytizing, but nonetheless retained connections with the court. In
1681, Charles II repaid a debt owed to Penn's father by granting him a large province on the west bank of the Delaware river in
North America. Penn drew up a frame of government providing for religious toleration in the new colony, which he named
Pennsylvania. After he had supervised the building of Philadelphia (1682-4), he returned to England and, on James II's accession,
secured the release of some 1,200 Quaker prisoners. Out of favour after the Glorious Revolution, he returned to America in 1699,
but financial mismanagement forced him to mortgage his rights as proprietor of the colony.

(Gardiner, J., & Wenborn, N. (eds.) (1995). The History Today Companion to British History. London: Collins & Brown.)

William Penn (1644-1718), founder of Pennsylvania. Son of an admiral, he was sent to a Puritan school and was expelled
from Oxford as a dissenter in 1660. Sent to Ireland to manage the family estates, he regularly attended the Quaker meeting at Cork,
and on his return to England he was twice imprisoned for proselytizing, but nonetheless retained connections with the court. In
1681, Charles II repaid a debt owed to Penn's father by granting him a large province on the west bank of the Delaware river in
North America. Penn drew up a frame of government providing for religious toleration in the new colony, which he named
Pennsylvania. After he had supervised the building of Philadelphia (1682-4), he returned to England and, on James II's accession,
secured the release of some 1,200 Quaker prisoners. Out of favour after the Glorious Revolution, he returned to America in 1699,
but financial mismanagement forced him to mortgage his rights as proprietor of the colony.

(Gardiner, J., & Wenborn, N. (eds.) (1995). The History Today Companion to British History. London: Collins & Brown.)

We are accustomed to thinking of military success as determined by quality of weaponry, rather than by food supply. But a
clear example of how improvements in food supply may decisively increase military success comes from the history of Maori New
Zealand. The Maori are the Polynesian people who were the first to settle New Zealand. Traditionally, they fought frequent fierce
wars against each other, but only against closely neighboring tribes. Those wars were limited by the modest productivity of their
agriculture, whose staple crop was sweet potatoes. It was not possible to grow enough sweet potatoes to feed an army in the field
for a long time or on distant marches. When Europeans arrived in New Zealand, they brought potatoes, which beginning around
1815 considerably increased Maori crop yields. Maori could now grow enough food to supply armies in the field for many weeks.
The result was a 15-year period in Maori history, from 1818 until 1833, when Maori tribes that had acquired potatoes and guns from
the English sent armies out on raids to attack tribes hundreds of miles away that had not yet acquired potatoes and guns. Thus, the
potato's productivity relieved previous limitations on Maori warfare, similar to the limitations that low-productivity corn agriculture
imposed on Maya warfare.

(Diamond, J. (2006). Collapse. London: Penguin.)

We are accustomed to thinking of military success as determined by quality of weaponry, rather than by food supply. But a
clear example of how improvements in food supply may decisively increase military success comes from the history of Maori New
Zealand. The Maori are the Polynesian people who were the first to settle New Zealand. Traditionally, they fought frequent fierce
wars against each other, but only against closely neighboring tribes. Those wars were limited by the modest productivity of their
agriculture, whose staple crop was sweet potatoes. It was not possible to grow enough sweet potatoes to feed an army in the field
for a long time or on distant marches. When Europeans arrived in New Zealand, they brought potatoes, which beginning around
1815 considerably increased Maori crop yields. Maori could now grow enough food to supply armies in the field for many weeks.
The result was a 15-year period in Maori history, from 1818 until 1833, when Maori tribes that had acquired potatoes and guns from
the English sent armies out on raids to attack tribes hundreds of miles away that had not yet acquired potatoes and guns. Thus, the
potato's productivity relieved previous limitations on Maori warfare, similar to the limitations that low-productivity corn agriculture
imposed on Maya warfare.

(Diamond, J. (2006). Collapse. London: Penguin.)

We are accustomed to thinking of military success as determined by quality of weaponry, rather than by food supply. But a
clear example of how improvements in food supply may decisively increase military success comes from the history of Maori New
Zealand. The Maori are the Polynesian people who were the first to settle New Zealand. Traditionally, they fought frequent fierce
wars against each other, but only against closely neighboring tribes. Those wars were limited by the modest productivity of their
agriculture, whose staple crop was sweet potatoes. It was not possible to grow enough sweet potatoes to feed an army in the field
for a long time or on distant marches. When Europeans arrived in New Zealand, they brought potatoes, which beginning around
1815 considerably increased Maori crop yields. Maori could now grow enough food to supply armies in the field for many weeks.
The result was a 15-year period in Maori history, from 1818 until 1833, when Maori tribes that had acquired potatoes and guns from
the English sent armies out on raids to attack tribes hundreds of miles away that had not yet acquired potatoes and guns. Thus, the
potato's productivity relieved previous limitations on Maori warfare, similar to the limitations that low-productivity corn agriculture
imposed on Maya warfare.

(Diamond, J. (2006). Collapse. London: Penguin.)