São correta a alternativa:

Item 1 - A função de oferta de um produto em concorrência perfeita é gerada pela soma horizontal das curvas de custo marginal de produção, a partir do ponto em que estas cortarem as respectivas curvas de custo fixo médio.

Seja Z = min{2L,3K}, a função de produção de uma firma monopolista (Z é a quantidade de produto, L o trabalho e K o capital), e seja Z = 6 - P, a curva de demanda de Z. Se o preço do trabalho é igual a 2 e o preço do capital é igual a 3,

Item 1 - O custo de produção de 2 unidades do produto é igual a 6.

Se X e Y são duas variáveis aleatórias quaisquer, pode-se afirmar que:

Item 3 - Se T = 2X + Y + 5, então E(T) = 2E(X) + E(Y) + 5.

Suponha que 40% dos empregados de uma grande empresa estejam a favor de sua representação sindical, e que se peça resposta anônima a uma amostra aleatória de 10 empregados. Pode-se afirmar que:

Item 3 - A probabilidade das respostas segue a distribuição binomial há que o atributo é contínuo.

Se X e Y são duas variáveis aleatórias quaisquer, pode-se afirmar que:

Item 4 - Se X e Y são variáveis aleatórias independentes, então E(X,Y) = E(X).E(Y).

III. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIARY MARKETING STEPS

An important distinction must be made between structures in trade and those in money, as both in its own way follows the law of one price. Trade initially took place in stapling centres, such as Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London and the like, to which sellers came to dispose of goods, and buyers came to acquire them. The staplers were divided among the First Hand, who carried the goods to and from, say, Amsterdam in distant trade; the Second Hand, who broke bulk, graded, sorted, standardized, repacked, and sometimes in between arranged for finishing processes such as curing and roasting, and in textiles, fulling sizing, washing, bleaching, dyeing and the like; and the Third Hand who was not relayed further to other markets. Stapling was based on a monopoly of information, as to what goods were available, and what wanted, in both cases where, along with the secrets of finishing. With time, these monopolies were eroded as the information became diffused. Since transport costs were positive, and in some instances sizeable, once the monopoly of information was lost suppliers and consumers got together in direct trade with no further need to rely on the intermediation of hte stapler. The finishing process could be conducted at either end, but the role of the emporium, entrepôt of relay was cut down to save transport and handling. Bordeaux began to send its sugar directly to Scandianvia from Saint Domingue without the necessity to weigh in at Amsterdam; Exeter and Hull their woollens to Cadiz, Lisbon and Hamburg, not to Amsterdam. Stockholm in the 20th century brought its wool directly from Australia, rather than London, and British re-exports shrank from 20-30 per cent of general imports in the 1780s to 15 per cent in 1910-1913.

Alfred Chandler found the same process of eliminating the middlemen to save handling and transport changes in the structure of American industry in the middle of the 19th century. As an enterprise rose from local to the regional to the national scale, distribution was taken back from wholesalers and jobbers and undertaken directly by the firm itself. In addition to the saving in handling charges, direct contact between seller and buyer permitted them to discuss possible improvements in the product, directly, without the filter of the intermediary merchant, and to understand each other better when it came to the producer instructing the buyer in product use, required in complex machinery and items such as chemicals that need precision in use. In today’s terminology, this is the provision of software, which ends up, Sune Carlson suggests, leading the seller to design his own worldwide network of distribution the more effectively to instruct the consumer, to train service personnel in efficient maintenance, and to maintain depots of spare parts.

Elimination of intermediary marketing steps has been a long drawn-out process in the application of the law of are price to trade, made economic as monopolies of information were diffused by direct contact, producing savings in transport and in communication about use.

The same forces are not found in money and capital markets, which have tended to remain organized in more hierarchical form. The reasons are several. First, economies of scale are probably greater in trading money than in trading commodities. Localities shift from net lenders to net borrowers and they converse more frequently and need a centralized market to minimize search costs. Secondly, costs of transporting money are far less than for goods so that the savings from shifting from indirect to direct trade are smaller. In combination these forces would argue for a single financial centre for a country or for the world. That solution, however, runs up against the need of financial institutions for credit information so detailed and up-to-date in a world of rapid change that it cannot be gathered, stored and maintained in a single centre giving the present capacity of computers. “Local knowledge” remains a critical adjunct of centralized statistics.

It is perhaps somewhat too strong to assert that saving in transport costs favour direct selling in traded goods, whereas search costs in borrowing or lending money favour a hierarchical organization of money flows where transport costs are negligible. For specialized lending, too many stages from one locality to a centre, across to another centre and down to a locality may filter out essential ingredients of the particulars of a problem. I once asked a banker in Aberdeen whether he got his information on oil-financing practices from Houston, Texas via New York and London or directly, and he said directly. Moreover in long-term lending, an initial underwriting syndicate need have no central location since structural costs of setting up the marketing group are overhead in character, met only once, and not repeated. These costs can be covered in underwriting commissions for the entire issue. In the present state of the art, however, the secondary market must have a buyer or seller who wants to trade one or at most a few bonds. It will take considerably greater cheapening of computer memories and distant communication to maintain bid and offer prices, and the location of the would-be traders, in one computer memory on a continuously changing basis reflecting data from the major and accessible money centres of the world (p.79-81).

According to the text:

Item 2 - Need of local, up-to-date, information is an obstacle to centralization of credit markets.

Nos termos do modelo IS-LM, indique se a alternativa abaixo são falsa ou verdadeira:

Item 0 - A política fiscal é relativamente ineficaz quando os investimentos são muito elásticos à taxa de juros.

Seja: !$ U \, = \, mínimo \,\, de \,\, \{ X_A; \, X_B\}, !$ a função utilidade de um consumidor; R, a renda; e P_A e P_B os preços respectivos de A e B. Para esse consumidor:

Item 1 - A utilidade marginal de um dos bens é sempre igual a zero.

Em mercado perfeitamente competitivo, cada ofertante pode optar entre dois tipos de plantas: a do tipo I, que custa $ 1.000 e cuja função de custo variável é CV₁ = 10q² (q é a quantidade produzida); e a do tipo II, que custa $ 2.205, com CV₂ = 5q². Sob essas condições, pode-se afirmar que:

Item 3 - Para produzir, cada uma, 14 unidades, as firmas serão indiferentes entre os dois tipos de planta.

A respeito dos três subconjuntos de !$ \mathfrak{R} !$ definidos por

!$ A \, = \, \{ (x,y) \,\, tal \,\, que \,\, x^2 \, + \, y^2 \, = \, 1 \} !$

!$ B\, = \, \{ (x,y) \,\, tal \,\, que \,\, ( x \, - \, 1)^2 \, + \, (y \, + \, 1)^2 \, \le \, 1\} !$

!$ C \, = \, \{ (x,y) \,\, tal \,\, que \,\, \mid x \mid \, + \, \mid y \mid \, \le \, 1 \} !$

Indique se a alternativa abaixo são verdadeira ou falsa:

Item 3 - O conjunto A!$ \cap !$C possui o dobro de elementos do conjunto A!$ \cap !$B.