O período 1947-61 caracterizou-se por um surto de expansão econômica apoiado na estratégia de industrialização por substituição de importações (ISI). Essa estratégia, que culminou com o Programa de Metas do governo Kubitschek, consolidou a indústria como o setor dinâmico da economia brasileira.

Item 1 - Políticas de controle do mercado de câmbio, instituídas inicialmente para enfrentar a crise do setor externo em 1947, acabaram se tornando o principal instrumento de promoção do desenvolvimento da indústria.

Com relação à Teoria do Equilíbrio Geral e do Bem Estar, é correto afirmar que:

Item 1 - Em uma economia com 2 bens e 2 insumos, com funções de utilidade e de produção diferenciáveis, em equilíbrio geral a taxa marginal de substituição no consumo é igual à taxa marginal de substituição na produção.

Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 3 - Se !$ f : \Re_+ \rightarrow \Re !$ é uma função diferenciável, estritamente crescente, estritamente côncava e com !$ f(0) = 0 !$, então !$ f !$ apresenta elasticidade menor do que 1 em todo o seu domínio.

Indique se a proposição está certo ou errado:

Item 4 - A curva J mostra como transcorre, ao longo do tempo, o efeito de uma política fiscal expansionista sobre a balança comercial.

Indique se a proposição abaixo, relativa ao modelo de Solow, está certo ou errado:

Item 2 - Na ausência de progresso tecnológico, uma redução da taxa de crescimento populacional aumenta a taxa de crescimento do produto per capita correspondente ao estado estacionário.

É correto afirmar a respeito do modelo de regressão linear clássico multivariado: !$ Y = Xγ + ε !$, com n observações e k > 2 variáveis explicativas, incluindo-se o intercepto.

Item 0 - Os coeficientes de inclinação não se alteram quando se modificam as unidades de medida de Y e X multiplicando-os por uma constante, por exemplo, transformando-se seus valores de reais para dólares.

BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THAT FOLLOWS, DETERMINE IF EVERY STATEMENT IS RIGHT OR WRONG.

SECOND TEXT

Sir, - Allow a working man to thank you for your able article on “strikes” in The Times of yesterday, and to avoid waste of your valuable space, I will proceed at once to give you a case in point.

I was three months ago at work for a good master in a good shop, one among 200, and quite content, as was the majority, with the remuneration received – viz., 5s per day. About this time trade meetings were convened to discuss the propriety of demanding an advance of 10 per cent, or 5s. 6d. per day, and a few of our men attended. A deputation was appointed and awaited on our employer, with an intimation that, unless their demand was complied with, a “strike” would be the result. The master plainly stated that, having contracts on hand to a very great amount, the completion of which in a few months was insured by heavy penalties, he could not, without great pecuniary loss, - indeed, not without risk of failure, - at once grant their request, but that, if his men would remain at their work on the then terms, he would endeavor to make such arrangements as would enable him to meet their demand when a portion of his present contracts were worked out, - say, in five or six month; but, no; the deputation were not inclined to entertain anything so reasonable as this. Other meetings were called, at which some half-dozen “speakers” and “grand movers” used all their eloquence to prove employers tyrants and workmen slaves. The result was a “turn-out”; the great majority going out because they were afraid to be marked men, and because they had no confidence in each other, although they were convinced they were thereby doing their employer an injustice and running a risk of gaining a questionable advantage for themselves. After remaining idle some time the contracts pressed so much that our employer was compelled to succumb, and we all returned with the advance demanded. But mark the sequel. I and a great many others were in a short time discharged, and arrangements were made to extend the time for several large contracts, thereby dispensing with our services. Another result is, that the high rate of wages in town has drawn so many hands from the country, although there was no lack of workmen before the advance, that I have not been able since to procure a job at the new rate of wages; and, Sir, my case is the case of hundreds besides. To keep myself from starving, I offered to work in a large shop at the old rate of 5s., but as soon as this became known I was literally hunted out of the shop, and I am now, no doubt, what is so much dreaded by all my class – a marked man.

I am not allowed to work for what my own conviction tells me is a fair remuneration, and cannot procure employment at the advanced rate, as no master is inclined to set on more workmen, under present circumstances, than will just complete what he is compelled by heavy penalties to finish in a given time. Thus, Sir, you see that numbers may remain out of employment- a burden to themselves and to society – that those who are so lucky as to be retained may exult in having obtained a trifling advantage, which they are all along afraid (and nor without reason) of losing every day. At the same time it is certain that had the “supply and demand” been duly considered, a strike or a rise would not have taken place, to throw us into this uncomfortable and ruinous state of affairs.

Your willingness to give ear to a poor man’s grievances, and my cause to complain, must be my apology for troubling you with so long a letter.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A Sufferer.

An Ostracized Workman to the Editor of the Times (Letter to The Times, October 10, 1853). Published in:

Charles Dickens, Hard Times. W.W. Norton & Co, 1990: 281-282.

According to the text, the author of the letter

Item 3 - blames the job losses on the employers inability to adjust to the higher wages.

Em relação a índices e deflacionamento de preços é correto afirmar:

Item 2 - Multiplicando-se um índice de preços de Laspeyres por um índice de quantidades de Laspeyres, obtém-se um índice relativo de valor das vendas (I(V_t|V₀)).

Julgue o item a seguir:

Item 1 - A distorção causada pelas externalidades de produção ocorre porque as empresas determinam seu nível de produção igualando o custo marginal privado de produção à receita marginal privada de produção, desconsiderando o custo social de produção.

BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THAT FOLLOWS, DETERMINE IF EVERY STATEMENT IS RIGHT OR WRONG.

THIRD TEXT

As dramatic as it was, the global financial crises of 1997-99 was only the most recent of a rash of crises that have devastated market economies over the last 25 years. By one calculation almost 100 countries experienced a severe currency or financial crisis during that period, with adverse consequences for their national budgets and economic growth. Such patterns clearly call for an explanation: although there has been no dearth of suggestions, a consensus is growing that at least part of the explanation lies in weak financial institutions, which result in part from inadequate government regulation. The pendulum has come full circle: from the burst of enthusiasm over deregulation, policymakers now appreciate why it is that the most successful economies have long had a strong tradition of financial regulation. In the Unites States financial regulation dates back to 1863, in the middle of the American Civil War, when it became apparent that a strong banking system was essential to create a new national economy and that such a system required a strong national regulatory structure. The most recent major lapse in regulation, the deregulation effort that began in 1981, led to the savings and loan debacle. The consequences of that crisis were so severe that the U.S. economy did not recover for close to a decade.

But many developing countries are struggling with precisely the opposite problem – an overregulated financial system that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs, stunting the growth of even well-established firms. One of the many adverse effects of the East Asian financial crisis is that countries have become wary of reforms that affect the financial sector, aware that they may leave the country worse off. This article argues that reforms are possible – and indeed needed – and can be undertaken without undue fear, but success requires understanding the basic principles of financial sector regulation. The article sets forth those principles.

Even before the crisis, a theoretical literature argued that the nature of financial market failures necessitated a strong role for government. Failures in the banking system have strong spillovers, or externalities, that reach well beyond the individuals and firms directly involved. To avoid a financial collapse, governments typically bail out the affected entity, whether or not formal deposit insurance is in place; this intervention itself gives rise to problems of moral hazard. Although the absence of formal deposit insurance might give depositors a slightly increased incentive to monitor financial institutions (because there is some uncertainty about whether they will actually be bailed out), individual monitoring is actually inefficient. Monitoring is a public good, and it needs to be publicly provided. Of course, at a more practical level, a small depositor cannot be expected to examine the books of a bank on a weekly basis; there is strong evidence that regulators and rating agencies have difficulties doing so. Indeed, the widespread misconceptions about the appropriate strategy for regulating the financial sector suggests that even so-called experts are not fully aware of some of the key issues. Why, then, should one expect more from an individual depositor with little training, interest, or capacity in the arcane details of financial accounting?

Despite its long history, financial market regulation is poorly understood, as evidenced by the disasters associate with deregulation in industrial and developing countries. Often such measures were pushed through a burst of enthusiasm for free markets without recognizing the inherent market failures associate with such markets. Today few economists advocate unregulated banking, but a similar ideological agenda has pushed excessive reliance on a single regulatory instrument – capital adequacy standards. The belief is that this measure entails the minimal interference with the workings of the market and avoids the well-recognized problems of unregulated banks. A deeper analysis of the financial sector, however, shows that such reliance is not only inefficient but may even be counterproductive under some circumstances.

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach. Joseph E. Stiglitz. The World Bank

Research Observer, vol. 16, nº 1, Spring 2001.

According to the text:

Item 2 - Since only a few understand the details of financial accounting, bank monitoring should be provided by the public sector.