Um indivíduo consome apenas os bens 1 e 2. Assumindo que o bem 1 é um bem inferior e o bem 2 é um bem normal e supondo que o preço do bem normal caia,

Item 3 - O efeito preço total do bem 2 é positivo e o do bem 1 é negativo.

Com relação aos modelos de crescimento de longo prazo, em que s = poupança, v = relação capital-produto e n = taxa exógena de crescimento de força de trabalho; responda certo ou errado:

Item 2 - Segundo os pós-Keynesianos, se s/v < n, a taxa de lucros pode aumentar sem que ocorra desemprego de máquinas e equipamentos.

Sejam A e B dois conjuntos quaisquer. Indique se o item é certo ou errado:

Item 3 - Seja !$ A=\{1,2,3,4\} !$ e !$ B=\{1,2,3,4\} !$. Então !$ A ⊂ B !$.

Indique se o item é certo ou errado, com base no Texto a que se refere.

PART I

Wage controls during the transition from central planning to a market economy

Freeing prices to alleviate imbalances has been a priority in most emerging market economies. It is therefore paradoxical that wage controls have been a key component of stabilization in many of these countries.

There is considerable skepticism among economist about the effectiveness of wage controls in general: they are intended to suppress market forces, introducing rigidities in the structure of wages and delaying adjustment to changing labor market conditions; they are often circumvented, and they are typically costly to administer. This pessimism is borne out by the experience of many countries with wage controls, as with other centralized means of wage determination. If wage controls are recommended during the transition to a market economy, therefore, their rationale must be predicated on exceptional circumstances.

As a brake on inflationary momentum, wage controls have figured in “heterodox” stabilization programs in Latin America and elsewhere. The object was to reduce the cost of adjusting an economy to lower rate of inflation by controlling a publicly visible price, limiting the extent to which inflationary expectations become sef-perpetuating. Formerly centrally planned economies have had an added and even more pressing reason for integrating incomes policies into their reform programs and maintaining them as an enduring feature of the economic regime: the weakness of governance of state enterprises by their legal owner, the state.

The weakness of governance has been especially serious at the “no-man’s land” stage, when central planning, with its detailed control of prices and wages, has been dismantled but before market forces have become an effective replacement. At this stage enterprise managers often owe their jobs to workers’ councils; the interests of capital, by contrast, have little representation. At the same time, the “soft-budget” problem - the perception that losses will ultimately be underwritten through subsidies and credit and that the firm will not be allowed to fail - is exacerbated when privatization is impending. Workers and managers, realizing that they have limited time to take advantage of their control of the firm, have little incentive to restrain their wage demands, since the benefits of such restraint would be reaped by the future owners and the state. The extent to which this occurs depends on how privatization is implemented - particularly whether existing stakeholders such as workers and managers are given a share of the privatized value of the firm.

(Coricelli, F. and T. Lane, 1993, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 8, n°2, July: 195-196).

According to the text:

Item 3 - Workers are not constrained to limit their wage demands when they know that their good behavior will go unrewarded.

Indique se o item é certo ou errado, com base no Texto a que se refere.

PART I

Wage controls during the transition from central planning to a market economy

Freeing prices to alleviate imbalances has been a priority in most emerging market economies. It is therefore paradoxical that wage controls have been a key component of stabilization in many of these countries.

There is considerable skepticism among economist about the effectiveness of wage controls in general: they are intended to suppress market forces, introducing rigidities in the structure of wages and delaying adjustment to changing labor market conditions; they are often circumvented, and they are typically costly to administer. This pessimism is borne out by the experience of many countries with wage controls, as with other centralized means of wage determination. If wage controls are recommended during the transition to a market economy, therefore, their rationale must be predicated on exceptional circumstances.

As a brake on inflationary momentum, wage controls have figured in “heterodox” stabilization programs in Latin America and elsewhere. The object was to reduce the cost of adjusting an economy to lower rate of inflation by controlling a publicly visible price, limiting the extent to which inflationary expectations become sef-perpetuating. Formerly centrally planned economies have had an added and even more pressing reason for integrating incomes policies into their reform programs and maintaining them as an enduring feature of the economic regime: the weakness of governance of state enterprises by their legal owner, the state.

The weakness of governance has been especially serious at the “no-man’s land” stage, when central planning, with its detailed control of prices and wages, has been dismantled but before market forces have become an effective replacement. At this stage enterprise managers often owe their jobs to workers’ councils; the interests of capital, by contrast, have little representation. At the same time, the “soft-budget” problem - the perception that losses will ultimately be underwritten through subsidies and credit and that the firm will not be allowed to fail - is exacerbated when privatization is impending. Workers and managers, realizing that they have limited time to take advantage of their control of the firm, have little incentive to restrain their wage demands, since the benefits of such restraint would be reaped by the future owners and the state. The extent to which this occurs depends on how privatization is implemented - particularly whether existing stakeholders such as workers and managers are given a share of the privatized value of the firm.

(Coricelli, F. and T. Lane, 1993, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 8, n°2, July: 195-196).

According to the text:

Item 4 - A “soft-budget” means that, for all practical purposes, there is no budget constraint.

Indique se o item abaixo é certo ou errado, com base no texto a que se refere.

PART II

Cambridge versus Cambridge

In most universities today, economics is booming. To undergraduates and businesspersons it spells money-making; to graduate students it offers a lucrative slot in a bank or a confortable billet in a university; to governments it promises technical wheezes for balancing the books and boosting industries. The dismal science, it seems, can do no wrong.

Harvard and Cambridge are ideally placed to exploit this boom. They can both lay claim to some of the most illustrious names in the history of the subject. And they both boast well-connected alumni and high-powered students. But nobody inside the profession doubts that Harvard is having a far better boom than Cambridge. An Oxford professor admits that Harvard has probably the best economics department in the world. A Princeton professor ranks Cambridge along, say, Phennsylvania State University. cambridge graduates frequently go on to Harvard’s graduate school; the compliment is rarely returned. What is wrong with Cambridge?

The decline of its economics department dates from its defeat in one of the noisiest battles in post-war economics - the so-called Cambridge versus Cambridge controversy. In the early 1960s a group of Cambridge economists led by Joan Robinson mounted a furious assault on neoclassical orthodoxy. The Massashusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) took up the case for the defense (Harvard being a gentlemanly backwater).

At stake was nothing less than the soul of the subject. Robinson et al. argued that neoclassical economics was interested in the wrong thing (the optimal allocation of given resources) and based on a false assumption (that man is a rational “utility maximizer.”) In the Cambridge view, the hottest subjects were te accumulation of capital and the distribution of income. To add spice to the debate, the Cambridges disagreed about method and ideology. MIT preferred mathematics and markets; Cambridge favoured elegant prose and state intervention. To the likes of Robinson, the paddy fields of China were far preferable to the skyscrapers of Manhattan.

The world went the Massachusetts way. Neoclassical economics is now international orthodoxy; the Cambridge tradition is taken seriously only in East Anglia and the Italian provinces. Economics is an over more mathematical subject. And state planning is dead.

The Cambridge controbersy did more than marginalise the dominant faction in the Cambridgeshire fens. It also divided the faculty and politicised appointments. Some senior figures, like Frank Hahn and James Meade, did the unpatriotic thing and sided with the other Cambridge. The result was civil war. It was impossible to change the syllabus or appoint a lecturer without an ideological feud. The divided faculty made a number of light-weight appointments. It also lost a generation of stars. Just three of the dozen or so who fled - Amartya Sen, Christopher Bliss and Jim Mirrlees - would make the nucleus of a world-class department.

That was almost two decades ago. Why has Cambridge taken so long to repair the damage? Partly because the place is so enthralled by its glorious past. Naming a road ofter Sidgwick, a building after Marshall and a seminar room after Keynes is dangerously close to ancestor worship. But even more important than its over-developed sense of history is its underdeveloped appetite for competition. While Cambridge sank into faction fighting, Harvard challenged MIT for the position as the best department in the world. To understand their different fates, you need to examine their rival philosophies of academic life.

(The Economist, Dec. 1991 - Jan. 1992, p.43).

According to the text:

Item 2 - Enthusiasm for Cambridge’s ideas is now restricted to a few places in India and Italy.

Se A, B e C são matrizes, indique como certo ou errado o item abaixo:

Item 0 - Para quaisquer A, B e C, todas quadradas de mesma ordem, tr(ABC)=tr(CBA).

Suponha uma economia caracterizada pelas seguintes relações:

C = 200 + 0,8Yd I = 300
T = 0,1Y M = 0,2Yd G = 240 X = 180
Em que:
Y = renda total; Yd = renda disponível após pagamento de impostos;
C = consumo, I = investimento, G = gasto do governo,
X = exportações, M = importações, T = imposto.

Indique se o item abaixo a respeito desta economia é certo ou errado:

Item 1 - O saldo comercial apresenta um déficit de $180.

Indique se o item é certo ou errado, com base no Texto a que se refere.

PART I

Wage controls during the transition from central planning to a market economy

Freeing prices to alleviate imbalances has been a priority in most emerging market economies. It is therefore paradoxical that wage controls have been a key component of stabilization in many of these countries.

There is considerable skepticism among economist about the effectiveness of wage controls in general: they are intended to suppress market forces, introducing rigidities in the structure of wages and delaying adjustment to changing labor market conditions; they are often circumvented, and they are typically costly to administer. This pessimism is borne out by the experience of many countries with wage controls, as with other centralized means of wage determination. If wage controls are recommended during the transition to a market economy, therefore, their rationale must be predicated on exceptional circumstances.

As a brake on inflationary momentum, wage controls have figured in “heterodox” stabilization programs in Latin America and elsewhere. The object was to reduce the cost of adjusting an economy to lower rate of inflation by controlling a publicly visible price, limiting the extent to which inflationary expectations become sef-perpetuating. Formerly centrally planned economies have had an added and even more pressing reason for integrating incomes policies into their reform programs and maintaining them as an enduring feature of the economic regime: the weakness of governance of state enterprises by their legal owner, the state.

The weakness of governance has been especially serious at the “no-man’s land” stage, when central planning, with its detailed control of prices and wages, has been dismantled but before market forces have become an effective replacement. At this stage enterprise managers often owe their jobs to workers’ councils; the interests of capital, by contrast, have little representation. At the same time, the “soft-budget” problem - the perception that losses will ultimately be underwritten through subsidies and credit and that the firm will not be allowed to fail - is exacerbated when privatization is impending. Workers and managers, realizing that they have limited time to take advantage of their control of the firm, have little incentive to restrain their wage demands, since the benefits of such restraint would be reaped by the future owners and the state. The extent to which this occurs depends on how privatization is implemented - particularly whether existing stakeholders such as workers and managers are given a share of the privatized value of the firm.

(Coricelli, F. and T. Lane, 1993, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 8, n°2, July: 195-196).

According to the text:

Item 3 - Even Though economists are doubtful about the effectiveness of incomes policies, such policies could be justified when the government is weak.

Com relação aos testes de hipóteses, podemos afirmar que:

Item 2 - A probabilidade !$ \beta !$ de cometer o erro tipo II aumenta à medida que o valor do parâmetro se afasta do valor testado.