Performance and accountability:

Making government work

Governments have always been keen to achieve results, but calls to improve public sector performance in OECD countries have become particularly loud and insistent over the last couple of decades.

Reasons include increasing claims on public expenditure, particularly pensions, healthcare and education, expectations of higher quality public services in line with rising living standards and, in many cases, reluctance on the part of citizens to pay ever higher taxes. Government also has to be more competitive in the face of other potential suppliers in areas like transport, communications and energy. It must show it can do the job it sets out to do.

That is why governments across the OECD have responded by setting goals and shifting the emphasis of government management and budgeting away from how much money to spend towards what is actually being achieved. New Zealand was among the first to adopt this results-oriented budgeting and management approach in the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s by Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. Later, Austria, Germany and Switzerland launched similar moves, and Turkey has recently begun a pilot phase of this process.

At the same time, these developments have pushed governments to modernise their accountability and control procedures. In particular, over the last 15 years or so, OECD governments have been engaged in reviewing and reforming the ways in which they keep control over large and complex operations in public services and how those responsible are held to account. Technological innovation and changes in the size and structure of government, in part reflecting privatisation and decentralisation, are also playing an important role in fostering these developments.

But these initiatives have by no means run their course, and their widespread implementation gives rise to some fundamental questions. What is meant by performance in the public service context, and how can it best be measured? Should a service be judged by, say, its accessibility or its financial cost, and who should do the judging? How can moves to increase the managerial responsibilities and decision-making powers of public servants be reconciled with democratic control and effective auditing procedures?

It is clearly not enough to argue that a reform works because it is based on sound research, or on an accepted procedure, or indeed that the government spent billions on its implementation. The main challenge is how to make reforms achieve their goal. This is the basic idea underlying performance-oriented budgeting and management: to shift the emphasis away from controlling inputs and towards achieving results. However, OECD countries are at different stages in this process and approaches to implementation vary.

Note: The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is celebrating its 50th anniversary, but its roots go back to the rubble of Europe after World War II. Determined to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors in the wake of World War I, European leaders realised that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to encourage co-operation and reconstruction, rather than punish the defeated.

(adapted from http://www.oecd.org)

The underlined word in “Governments have always been keen to achieve results” can be replaced by

Analise os itens listados de acordo com sua correção gramatical, adequação à norma culta e boa redação.

I. O jogo foi o mais assistido dos últimos tempos: recorde de público.

II. As regras foram desobedecidas pelo grupo.

III. Sempre preferimos o computador do que a televisão.

Assinale

Performance and accountability:

Making government work

Governments have always been keen to achieve results, but calls to improve public sector performance in OECD countries have become particularly loud and insistent over the last couple of decades.

Reasons include increasing claims on public expenditure, particularly pensions, healthcare and education, expectations of higher quality public services in line with rising living standards and, in many cases, reluctance on the part of citizens to pay ever higher taxes. Government also has to be more competitive in the face of other potential suppliers in areas like transport, communications and energy. It must show it can do the job it sets out to do.

That is why governments across the OECD have responded by setting goals and shifting the emphasis of government management and budgeting away from how much money to spend towards what is actually being achieved. New Zealand was among the first to adopt this results-oriented budgeting and management approach in the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s by Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. Later, Austria, Germany and Switzerland launched similar moves, and Turkey has recently begun a pilot phase of this process.

At the same time, these developments have pushed governments to modernise their accountability and control procedures. In particular, over the last 15 years or so, OECD governments have been engaged in reviewing and reforming the ways in which they keep control over large and complex operations in public services and how those responsible are held to account. Technological innovation and changes in the size and structure of government, in part reflecting privatisation and decentralisation, are also playing an important role in fostering these developments.

But these initiatives have by no means run their course, and their widespread implementation gives rise to some fundamental questions. What is meant by performance in the public service context, and how can it best be measured? Should a service be judged by, say, its accessibility or its financial cost, and who should do the judging? How can moves to increase the managerial responsibilities and decision-making powers of public servants be reconciled with democratic control and effective auditing procedures?

It is clearly not enough to argue that a reform works because it is based on sound research, or on an accepted procedure, or indeed that the government spent billions on its implementation. The main challenge is how to make reforms achieve their goal. This is the basic idea underlying performance-oriented budgeting and management: to shift the emphasis away from controlling inputs and towards achieving results. However, OECD countries are at different stages in this process and approaches to implementation vary.

Note: The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is celebrating its 50th anniversary, but its roots go back to the rubble of Europe after World War II. Determined to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors in the wake of World War I, European leaders realised that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to encourage co-operation and reconstruction, rather than punish the defeated.

(adapted from http://www.oecd.org)

The word that has the same meaning as “fostering” in “fostering these developments” is

Analise os itens listados de acordo com sua correção gramatical, adequação à norma culta e boa redação.

I. Assim se fazem os homens.

II. Menino, não faz isso com tua mãe!

III. Fazei vossa vontade.

Assinale

Em relação à competência privativa do Senado Federal, analise os itens a seguir:

I. processar e julgar Ministro de Estado em crime conexo a crime de responsabilidade;

II. suspender a execução de lei declarada inconstitucional por decisão definitiva do STF;

III. aprovar a escolha dos chefes de missão diplomática de caráter permanente.

Assinale

Performance and accountability:

Making government work

Governments have always been keen to achieve results, but calls to improve public sector performance in OECD countries have become particularly loud and insistent over the last couple of decades.

Reasons include increasing claims on public expenditure, particularly pensions, healthcare and education, expectations of higher quality public services in line with rising living standards and, in many cases, reluctance on the part of citizens to pay ever higher taxes. Government also has to be more competitive in the face of other potential suppliers in areas like transport, communications and energy. It must show it can do the job it sets out to do.

That is why governments across the OECD have responded by setting goals and shifting the emphasis of government management and budgeting away from how much money to spend towards what is actually being achieved. New Zealand was among the first to adopt this results-oriented budgeting and management approach in the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s by Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. Later, Austria, Germany and Switzerland launched similar moves, and Turkey has recently begun a pilot phase of this process.

At the same time, these developments have pushed governments to modernise their accountability and control procedures. In particular, over the last 15 years or so, OECD governments have been engaged in reviewing and reforming the ways in which they keep control over large and complex operations in public services and how those responsible are held to account. Technological innovation and changes in the size and structure of government, in part reflecting privatisation and decentralisation, are also playing an important role in fostering these developments.

But these initiatives have by no means run their course, and their widespread implementation gives rise to some fundamental questions. What is meant by performance in the public service context, and how can it best be measured? Should a service be judged by, say, its accessibility or its financial cost, and who should do the judging? How can moves to increase the managerial responsibilities and decision-making powers of public servants be reconciled with democratic control and effective auditing procedures?

It is clearly not enough to argue that a reform works because it is based on sound research, or on an accepted procedure, or indeed that the government spent billions on its implementation. The main challenge is how to make reforms achieve their goal. This is the basic idea underlying performance-oriented budgeting and management: to shift the emphasis away from controlling inputs and towards achieving results. However, OECD countries are at different stages in this process and approaches to implementation vary.

Note: The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is celebrating its 50th anniversary, but its roots go back to the rubble of Europe after World War II. Determined to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors in the wake of World War I, European leaders realised that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to encourage co-operation and reconstruction, rather than punish the defeated.

(adapted from http://www.oecd.org)

The fact that “OECD countries are at different stages in this process” is a matter of

O enunciado a seguir refere-se a questão.

No primeiro momento do dia 01/01/20X1 a Cia. Comercial apurou o seguinte balancete:

Com relação a esse balancete, sabe-se que

• o estoque era composto por 100 unidades do produto A e 50 unidades do produto B; e que é controlado periodicamente (no final de cada mês) e mensurado pelo método do custo médio ponderado fixo.

• as expectativas de tempo de vida útil e de valor residual das máquinas são: tempo de vida útil = 5 anos (máquina X) e 15 anos (máquina Y); valor residual = $2.000 (máquina X) e $9.000 (máquina Y).

Durante o mês de janeiro/20X1 a Cia. Comercial efetuou as seguintes transações:

• Compra de mercadorias: 50 unidades produto A, à vista, por $85 cada; 40 unidades do produto B, a prazo, por $109 cada. O prazo de pagamento é de 45 dias, portanto, coerente com o prazo normal de mercado e o fornecedor não cobrou qualquer juro por esse período.

• Venda de mercadorias: 80 unidades produto A, à vista, por $110 cada; 80 unidades do produto B, à vista, por $200 cada.

• Pagamento de contas a pagar a fornecedores (referente ao saldo inicial): $6.000.

• Fechamento da folha de pagamentos de janeiro e reconhecimento da despesa de salários no valor total de $3.000, esse valor só será pago aos empregados no dia 03/02/20X1.

• Reconhecimento da despesa de aluguel de janeiro e respectivo pagamento integral no valor $4.000

• Reconhecimento e apropriação da despesa financeira correspondente aos empréstimos e financiamentos no valor de $200. Os juros serão pagos junto com a amortização do principal (em 20X4)

• Aumento do capital social no valor total de $20.000, sendo $18.000 integralizados imediatamente em dinheiro e $2.000 a integralizar em 20X3.

• Reconhecimento da depreciação do imobilizado.

• No final do dia 31/01/20X1 a entidade vendeu a máquina X por $8.000 à vista.

Qual seria o valor total do custo das mercadorias vendidas em janeiro/20X1?

Performance and accountability:

Making government work

Governments have always been keen to achieve results, but calls to improve public sector performance in OECD countries have become particularly loud and insistent over the last couple of decades.

Reasons include increasing claims on public expenditure, particularly pensions, healthcare and education, expectations of higher quality public services in line with rising living standards and, in many cases, reluctance on the part of citizens to pay ever higher taxes. Government also has to be more competitive in the face of other potential suppliers in areas like transport, communications and energy. It must show it can do the job it sets out to do.

That is why governments across the OECD have responded by setting goals and shifting the emphasis of government management and budgeting away from how much money to spend towards what is actually being achieved. New Zealand was among the first to adopt this results-oriented budgeting and management approach in the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s by Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. Later, Austria, Germany and Switzerland launched similar moves, and Turkey has recently begun a pilot phase of this process.

At the same time, these developments have pushed governments to modernise their accountability and control procedures. In particular, over the last 15 years or so, OECD governments have been engaged in reviewing and reforming the ways in which they keep control over large and complex operations in public services and how those responsible are held to account. Technological innovation and changes in the size and structure of government, in part reflecting privatisation and decentralisation, are also playing an important role in fostering these developments.

But these initiatives have by no means run their course, and their widespread implementation gives rise to some fundamental questions. What is meant by performance in the public service context, and how can it best be measured? Should a service be judged by, say, its accessibility or its financial cost, and who should do the judging? How can moves to increase the managerial responsibilities and decision-making powers of public servants be reconciled with democratic control and effective auditing procedures?

It is clearly not enough to argue that a reform works because it is based on sound research, or on an accepted procedure, or indeed that the government spent billions on its implementation. The main challenge is how to make reforms achieve their goal. This is the basic idea underlying performance-oriented budgeting and management: to shift the emphasis away from controlling inputs and towards achieving results. However, OECD countries are at different stages in this process and approaches to implementation vary.

Note: The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is celebrating its 50th anniversary, but its roots go back to the rubble of Europe after World War II. Determined to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors in the wake of World War I, European leaders realised that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to encourage co-operation and reconstruction, rather than punish the defeated.

(adapted from http://www.oecd.org)

In the fifth paragraph, it becomes clear that