Há mais de uma década a economia brasileira vem se abrindo ao exterior. A abertura iniciou-se timidamente no final da década de 1980, transformou-se em estratégia oficial no início da década de 1990 e continua a ocorrer, com adaptações, até o presente. A natureza e os impactos da abertura nos permitem afirmar que:

Item 1 - A abertura e a apreciação do real não tiveram impactos no Brasil semelhantes aos registrados, antes, no México: naquele país houve extensa destruição de segmentos da indústria e a transformação de outros em 'maquiadores' de produtos para a exportação.

Considere a função !$ F : \Re^3 \rightarrow \Re !$ diferenciável !$ \nabla F(x) !$ denotando o gradiente de !$ F !$ no ponto !$ x ∈ \Re^3 !$. Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 1 - Se !$ F !$ for homogênea do segundo grau e no ponto (2,6,10) seu gradiente for !$ \nabla F (2,6,10) = (1,1,4) !$, conclui-se que seu valor no ponto (1,3,5) é igual a !$ F = (1,3,5) = 6 !$.

Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 0 - A solução da equação diferencial !$ \And = y - y^3 !$ apresenta 3 equilíbrios estacionários quando !$ t \rightarrow \infty !$, dependendo da condição inicial: y = -1, y = 0 e y = 1. O equilíbrio y = 0 é o único que é instável.

Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 1 - O valor presente, em !$ t = 0 !$, de um fluxo de pagamentos iguais a 50 nos períodos !$ t = 1,3,5,... !$ e -60 nos períodos !$ t = 2,4,6,... !$ é sempre positivo se a taxa de juros (compostos), supostamente constante, for superior a 20%.

Com respeito à Teoria da Demanda, julgue o seguinte item:

Item 1 - As perdas sociais associadas às políticas de preços mínimos para bens agrícolas são minoradas quando as curvas de demanda por bens agrícolas são inelásticas em seus segmentos relevantes.

Examinando o desempenho da economia brasileira na década de 1930 verifica-se que, no começo da década, a crise internacional e uma sucessão de enormes safras de café provocaram quedas de PIB real. Entretanto, depois de 1932 a economia brasileira passou a registrar um acentuado crescimento. Sobre esses eventos, pode-se afirmar que:

Item 4 - O crescimento da indústria após 1932 não se fez acompanhar da diversificação da estrutura produtiva. Houve reduzida expansão da produção de bens intermediários; em 1939, a participação desses bens no valor da produção industrial era pequena.

BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THAT FOLLOWS, DETERMINE IF EVERY STATEMENT IS RIGHT OR WRONG.

THIRD TEXT

As dramatic as it was, the global financial crises of 1997-99 was only the most recent of a rash of crises that have devastated market economies over the last 25 years. By one calculation almost 100 countries experienced a severe currency or financial crisis during that period, with adverse consequences for their national budgets and economic growth. Such patterns clearly call for an explanation: although there has been no dearth of suggestions, a consensus is growing that at least part of the explanation lies in weak financial institutions, which result in part from inadequate government regulation. The pendulum has come full circle: from the burst of enthusiasm over deregulation, policymakers now appreciate why it is that the most successful economies have long had a strong tradition of financial regulation. In the Unites States financial regulation dates back to 1863, in the middle of the American Civil War, when it became apparent that a strong banking system was essential to create a new national economy and that such a system required a strong national regulatory structure. The most recent major lapse in regulation, the deregulation effort that began in 1981, led to the savings and loan debacle. The consequences of that crisis were so severe that the U.S. economy did not recover for close to a decade.

But many developing countries are struggling with precisely the opposite problem – an overregulated financial system that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs, stunting the growth of even well-established firms. One of the many adverse effects of the East Asian financial crisis is that countries have become wary of reforms that affect the financial sector, aware that they may leave the country worse off. This article argues that reforms are possible – and indeed needed – and can be undertaken without undue fear, but success requires understanding the basic principles of financial sector regulation. The article sets forth those principles.

Even before the crisis, a theoretical literature argued that the nature of financial market failures necessitated a strong role for government. Failures in the banking system have strong spillovers, or externalities, that reach well beyond the individuals and firms directly involved. To avoid a financial collapse, governments typically bail out the affected entity, whether or not formal deposit insurance is in place; this intervention itself gives rise to problems of moral hazard. Although the absence of formal deposit insurance might give depositors a slightly increased incentive to monitor financial institutions (because there is some uncertainty about whether they will actually be bailed out), individual monitoring is actually inefficient. Monitoring is a public good, and it needs to be publicly provided. Of course, at a more practical level, a small depositor cannot be expected to examine the books of a bank on a weekly basis; there is strong evidence that regulators and rating agencies have difficulties doing so. Indeed, the widespread misconceptions about the appropriate strategy for regulating the financial sector suggests that even so-called experts are not fully aware of some of the key issues. Why, then, should one expect more from an individual depositor with little training, interest, or capacity in the arcane details of financial accounting?

Despite its long history, financial market regulation is poorly understood, as evidenced by the disasters associate with deregulation in industrial and developing countries. Often such measures were pushed through a burst of enthusiasm for free markets without recognizing the inherent market failures associate with such markets. Today few economists advocate unregulated banking, but a similar ideological agenda has pushed excessive reliance on a single regulatory instrument – capital adequacy standards. The belief is that this measure entails the minimal interference with the workings of the market and avoids the well-recognized problems of unregulated banks. A deeper analysis of the financial sector, however, shows that such reliance is not only inefficient but may even be counterproductive under some circumstances.

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach. Joseph E. Stiglitz. The World Bank

Research Observer, vol. 16, nº 1, Spring 2001.

According to the text:

Item 1 - Since it interferes minimally with the functioning of markets, capital adequacy standards is the ideal regulatory instrument.

Considere as seguintes equações do modelo estrutural:

Equação de Demanda: !$ Q_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 P_t + \alpha_2R_t + u_{1t} !$

Equação de oferta: !$ Q_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1P_t + \beta_2P_{t-1} + u_{1t} !$

em que no período t, Q_t é a quantidade de produto; P_t , o preço (endógeno) do produto; R_t , a renda do consumidor; u_it , o distúrbio aleatório da equação de demanda e u_2t , o distúrbio aleatório da equação de oferta. A partir destas equações são obtidas as equações na forma reduzida:

!$ P_t = \pi_0 + \pi_1R_t + \pi_2P_{t-1} + v_{1t} !$ e !$ Q_t = \pi_3 - \pi_4 R_t + \pi_5P_{t-1} + w_t !$.

Item 0 - Assim sendo, !$ \pi_0 = { \large \beta_0 - \alpha_0 \over \alpha_1 - \beta_1} !$, !$ \pi_1 = { \large \alpha_2 \over \alpha_1 - \beta_1} !$ e !$ \pi_2 = { \large \beta_2 \over \alpha_1 - \beta_1} !$.

Assinale C (certo) ou E (errado):

Item 0 - Um investidor aplica mensalmente 1000 unidades monetárias em um fundo de investimento que remunera as aplicações à taxa de juros (compostos) de 2% a.m.. Se o investidor fizer 3 aplicações, o montante no instante do último depósito será 3120 unidades monetárias.

BASED ON YOUR INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THAT FOLLOWS, DETERMINE IF EVERY STATEMENT IS RIGHT OR WRONG.

THIRD TEXT

As dramatic as it was, the global financial crises of 1997-99 was only the most recent of a rash of crises that have devastated market economies over the last 25 years. By one calculation almost 100 countries experienced a severe currency or financial crisis during that period, with adverse consequences for their national budgets and economic growth. Such patterns clearly call for an explanation: although there has been no dearth of suggestions, a consensus is growing that at least part of the explanation lies in weak financial institutions, which result in part from inadequate government regulation. The pendulum has come full circle: from the burst of enthusiasm over deregulation, policymakers now appreciate why it is that the most successful economies have long had a strong tradition of financial regulation. In the Unites States financial regulation dates back to 1863, in the middle of the American Civil War, when it became apparent that a strong banking system was essential to create a new national economy and that such a system required a strong national regulatory structure. The most recent major lapse in regulation, the deregulation effort that began in 1981, led to the savings and loan debacle. The consequences of that crisis were so severe that the U.S. economy did not recover for close to a decade.

But many developing countries are struggling with precisely the opposite problem – an overregulated financial system that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs, stunting the growth of even well-established firms. One of the many adverse effects of the East Asian financial crisis is that countries have become wary of reforms that affect the financial sector, aware that they may leave the country worse off. This article argues that reforms are possible – and indeed needed – and can be undertaken without undue fear, but success requires understanding the basic principles of financial sector regulation. The article sets forth those principles.

Even before the crisis, a theoretical literature argued that the nature of financial market failures necessitated a strong role for government. Failures in the banking system have strong spillovers, or externalities, that reach well beyond the individuals and firms directly involved. To avoid a financial collapse, governments typically bail out the affected entity, whether or not formal deposit insurance is in place; this intervention itself gives rise to problems of moral hazard. Although the absence of formal deposit insurance might give depositors a slightly increased incentive to monitor financial institutions (because there is some uncertainty about whether they will actually be bailed out), individual monitoring is actually inefficient. Monitoring is a public good, and it needs to be publicly provided. Of course, at a more practical level, a small depositor cannot be expected to examine the books of a bank on a weekly basis; there is strong evidence that regulators and rating agencies have difficulties doing so. Indeed, the widespread misconceptions about the appropriate strategy for regulating the financial sector suggests that even so-called experts are not fully aware of some of the key issues. Why, then, should one expect more from an individual depositor with little training, interest, or capacity in the arcane details of financial accounting?

Despite its long history, financial market regulation is poorly understood, as evidenced by the disasters associate with deregulation in industrial and developing countries. Often such measures were pushed through a burst of enthusiasm for free markets without recognizing the inherent market failures associate with such markets. Today few economists advocate unregulated banking, but a similar ideological agenda has pushed excessive reliance on a single regulatory instrument – capital adequacy standards. The belief is that this measure entails the minimal interference with the workings of the market and avoids the well-recognized problems of unregulated banks. A deeper analysis of the financial sector, however, shows that such reliance is not only inefficient but may even be counterproductive under some circumstances.

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach. Joseph E. Stiglitz. The World Bank

Research Observer, vol. 16, nº 1, Spring 2001.

According to the text:

Item 2 - Ideology, not technical arguments, have provided the stimuli for deregulation of the banking sector.