Classifique, como V ou F, as afirmativas abaixo:

Item 0: Quanto mais inclinada a curva IS e mais achatada a curva LM, mais eficaz é a política fiscal.

Em uma universidade, 30% dos homens e 20% das mulheres estudam matemática. Além disso, 45% dos estudantes são mulheres. Se um estudante é escolhido aleatoriamente:

Item 0: A probabilidade dele estudar matemática é 0,255.

THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

As also seen in the first paragraph:

Item 0: Stringent environmental regulations mean reigorous environmental rules.

Em determinado país e durante certo ano realizaram-se as seguintes transações entre residentes e não-residentes, medidas em milhões de dólares.

• Exportações de mercadorias (FOB) 12.000
• Importações de mercadorias (FOB) 14.000
• Gastos de turistas nacionais no exterior em Viagens Internacionais 1.000
• Gastos de não-residentes no país em Viagens de Turismo 500
• Juros pagos ao exterior 4.300
• Juros recebidos do exterior 1.200
• Remessa líquida de dividendos 1.100
• Empréstimos e financiamentos líquidos 600
• Pagamento de Amortizações 4.000
• Investimentos diretos 1.000
• Pagamentos de atrasados comerciais 800

Item 1: O saldo de transações correntes é deficitár o em US$ 2,7 bilhões.

Tome um modelo de equilíbrio geral com ofertas fixas de dois bens e dois indivíduos, também conhecido como modelo de troca. Considere em concorrência perfeita, onde na situação inicial as curvas de indiferença dos dois indivíduos se cruzam. Nesta situação tem-se que:

Item 1: na situação inicial, o cruzamento das curvas de indiferença implica igualdade das taxas marginais de substituição de cada indivíduo.

THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

As found in the fourth and fifth paragraphs:

Item 2: the phrase “international trade patterns” measn “marcas-padrões internacionais”.

O governo estabelece um imposto específico sobre as vendas de calças jeans. Supondo que esse mercado seja competitivo,

Item 2: o imposto será distribuído entre vendedores e consumidores, dependendo da sensibilidade das curvas de oferta e demanda às variações de preço.

THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

As also seen in the first paragraph:

Item 2: Stringent environmental regulations mean indulgent environmental regulations.

THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

As found in the third and fourth paragraphs:

Item 2: the author states that these two hypotheses were not confirmed by the data related to them.

Considere uma economia Kaleckiana, com dois setores. No primeiro, todas as empresas agem de acordo com as regras de concorrência perfeita (é o setor “competitivo). O segundo setor, “oligopolizado”, é formado por empresas monopolistas, oligopolistas, e de concorrência monopolística. No setor “competitivo” os custos marginais (compostos apenas pelos custos salariais) são crescentes como nível de produção. A demanda pelos produtos dos setor depende de seus preços relativos, e do nível de renda global. No setor “oligopolizado”, os preços são dados por um mark-up sobre os custos salariais:

P = (1 + m) w/a

onde:
p = preço
m = mark-up
w = salário nominal
a = produtividade do trabalho (suposta constante)

O mark-up é fixado de forma a cobrir outros custos da empresa, e gerar liquidamente a taxa de lucro desejada sobre o capital. Por sua vez, a taxa de lucro desejada depende positivamente da taxa real de juros de longo prazo. O mark-up inicial é inferior ao mark-up neoclássico, ou seja, o lucro de curto prazo é inferior ao máximo.

Suponha que o investimento é composto por dois itens: o investimento no setor “competitivo”, que varia inversamente com a taxa real de juros, e o investimento no setor “oligopolizado”, que varia positivamente com a taxa de utilização da capacidade instalada.

Os trabalhadores consomem integralmente sua renda, mas a propensão a consumir dos capitalistas é menor do que a unidade.

Suponha um aumento na taxa real de juros. Assinale “Falsa” ou “Verdadeira” para cada uma das afirmações abaixo:

Item 1: A produção permanece constante no setor “competitivo”.