THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

As also find in the first paragraph of the text:

Item 0: “countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program” can be translated as “países que conseguem executar um programa de proteção ambiental”.

Para um modelo de monopólio com discriminação de preços em dois mercados diferentes,

Item 4: Soma-se horizontalmente as curvas de demanda de cada mercado como parte da representação geométrica do equilíbrio da firma.

Seja uma amostra aleatória !$ x_1 !$, !$ x_2 !$, .... , !$ x_n !$ de uma população com média !$ μ !$ e variância !$ σ^2 !$. Considere os estimadores para a média:

!$ μ_1 = x_1 !$, !$ μ_2 = { \large 1 \over n} \sum^n_{i-1} xi !$, !$ μ_3 = x_{(n/2)} !$.

onde !$ x_{(n/2)} !$ corresponde ao (n/2)-ésimo elemento da amostra após a ordenação da mesma em forma crescente.

Item 4: Se a distribuição da população é normal, para n fixo, as distribuições dos estimadores !$ μ_1 !$, !$ μ_2 !$, !$ μ_3 !$ também são normais.

THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON PATTERNS OF WORLD TRADE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

James A. Tobey

In theory, environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of polluting outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations (Pethig, 1976; Siebert, 1977; McGuire, 1982). In contrast, countries that fail to undertake an environmental protection program presumably increase their comparative advantage in the production of items that damage the invironment. This relationship between trade and environmental policy receives considerable attention whenever countries are in the process of passing new pollution control measures. Groups who oppose existing measures, of the implementation of stiffer measures, argue that they reduce the ability of polluting industries to compete internationally. With foreign trade an increasingly important sector in many of the world’s economies, the arguments of such groups are now frequently weighted very heavily.

The premise that trade suffers from the imposition of environmental policy has a strong element of a priori plausibility but, surprisingly, has little empirical support. Several macroeconometric models (D’Arge, 1974; Robison, 1986; OECD, 1985) have predicted that pollution control measures should lead to a small but discernible effect on the balance of trade, but there are few studies to confirm this prediction.

The location-of-industry studies (Leonard, 1988; Pearson, 1987, 1985; Walter, 1985) have explored the related ideas that stringent pollution control measures push industries out of the U.S. (the ‘industrial-flight’ hypothesis), and that less-developed countries compete to attract multinational industries by minimizing their own environmental policies (the ‘pollution-haven’ hypothesis). Their investigations, however, have been unable to find evidence in support of either hypothesis.

The present paper complement the results of the less rigorous location of industy studies by providing an empirical test of the hypothesis that stringent environmental policy has caused trade patterns to deviate in commodities produced by the world’s ‘dirty’ industries.

Extraído de: TOBEY, James A. The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world trade: an empirical test. Kiklos; international review for social science, Basel, v.43, n.2, p.191-209.

In the fifth pargraph, the author concludes that:

Item 3: constraints imposed by environment regulations usually impede the operation of polluting industries.

Considere uma economia onde o ajustamento de preços é descrito pela Curva de Phillips. Classifique, como V ou F, a afirmativa abaixo:

Item 3: Quanto mais indexada for a economia menores os custos em termos de produto e emprego de uma política monetária como instrumento de combate à inflação.

Seja uma amostra aleatória !$ x_1 !$, !$ x_2 !$, .... , !$ x_n !$ de uma população com média !$ μ !$ e variância !$ σ^2 !$. Considere os estimadores para a média:

!$ μ_1 = x_1 !$, !$ μ_2 = { \large 1 \over n} \sum^n_{i-1} xi !$, !$ μ_3 = x_{(n/2)} !$.

onde !$ x_{(n/2)} !$ corresponde ao (n/2)-ésimo elemento da amostra após a ordenação da mesma em forma crescente.

Item 1: Para !$ n \ge2 !$ tem-se que a relação entre as variâncias é dada por: !$ var(μ_1) !$ !$ < !$ !$ var(μ_3) !$ !$ \ge var(μ_2) !$.

O governo estabelece um imposto específico sobre as vendas de calças jeans. Supondo que esse mercado seja competitivo,

Item 0: os vendedores transferem todo o imposto para os consumidores, via aumento de preço.

Considere um mercado descrito pela curva inversa de demanda P(Q) = 11 - Q, sendo que para Q>11, P = 0. Suponha que haja duas firmas produtoras que possuam custos dados por:

!$ C_1(q_1) = q^2_1 !$ e !$ C_2(q_2) = { \large q^2_2 \over 2} + q_2 !$

Item 0: A curva de oferta da firma 1 é !$ q_1(p) = 2p !$.

Dada a equação !$ { \large d_y \over d_t} = - 0,5 y + 10 !$, indique se as afirmativas abaixo são verdadeiras ou falsas.

Item 0: A equação é convergente.

Dada uma função de produção homogênea é correto afirmar que:

Item 0: Existem retornos constantes de escala.